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Senate
VIETNAM
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I
have read with great interest the speech
by the distingushed Senator from Kentucky 1Mr. CooPER l, and I also listened
to what he had to say and the colloquy
which ensued subsequent to his deliverance of the speech.
I commend the Senator from Kentucky !Mr. COOPER] for showing his
usual calmness, good judgment, restraint,
and wisdom in what he has to say, and
to assure him that he has a great deal
of company in what he has said.
When it comes to worrying about the
situation in Vietnam, it Is the shadow
which affects all our lives, and it is preeminent to the consideration of any other
question.
When I think of how much Vietnam is
costing us in men and money, it makes
me sad indeed to consider the tragedy
which is the lot of tlus country in that
far distant land.
We became involved in Vietnam because of mistakes, because of miscalculations, because of misunderstandings, and
because of good intentions.
As was pointed out in the Senate this
afternoon by the distinguished Senator
from North Dakota !Mr. YouNG], it is
too late to question how or why we got
into Vietnam. The question is moot. It
belongs to history. There is no question,
as far as any Member of the Senate is
concerned that I know of, of withdrawing from Vietnam at this time. But I do
think the overriding question, if not the

only question, in the mind of every Senator, regardless of his position on this subject, whether he is labeled a dove or a
hawk, or has no label, is to find a way
to the negotiating table, to the ways in
which an honorable truce, or an honorable peace or an honorable settlement,
can be achieved.
It was brought out that perhaps the
bombing should be suspended, and that
thrs would pave the way to negotiations.
Frankly, I would like to advocate a suspension of the bombing, because I have
never advocated the bombing itself; but
I feel, if we were to suspend the bombing and there were no reaction on the
part of North Vietnam, the reaction on
our part, both government and people,
would be far more bitter and far more
dangerous than is the situation at the
present time.
Perhaps the distinguished Senator
from Kentucky [Mr. COOPER] has given
us a way out by means of which bombing would be confined to interdiction of
supply routes and would increase at the
17th parallel and along the Ho Chi Minh
Trail. It is certainly a proposal worthy
of consideration.
As far as the membership of this body
Is concerned, I wish to state that I believe in the right of dissent. No matter
how a Senator is labeled, he does have a
right to dissent and the right to express
his opinions as he sees fit, but always, I
would hope, constructively.
I would not consider even those who
say, "Go in all the way," or who want to
turn North Vietnam back into the Stone
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there Js ever present the possibility of Its
eruption into a war of regional, continental
or world-wide dlmenslons.
The con!llct In VIet Nam may end, of
course, long before It matriculates Into war
with China or universal nuclear catastrophe.
That Is certainly the rational hope Whether
or not It Is an attaina ble hope Is another
mater. In any event, the VIetnamese confilet now, today, already has the capacity to
shake the precarious base of cl vlllzed human
survival. That will continue to be the case
unt!l the war begins to yield to rational
settlement.
Whatever else It Is, therefore, the war In
Viet Nam Is a most urgent warning to all
nations. It flashes a danger signal with
respect to the adequacy of the present International Instruments of peace. These instruments have not only failed to prevent
a breakdown of peace In Viet Nam; they
also appear Incapable of restoring peace In
any prompt and generally acceptable fashion.
It Is high time, therefore, to not e with
emphasis that the structure of International
order which has evolved during the past
twenty years Is, to say the least, dangerously
haphazard. As It Is now, each state has Its
own formula for safeguarding the security
of Its people. Each state tends to blend Into
that formula, In various combinations, a supply of unl!ateral military power and a participation In a variety of bilateral and regional defense arrangements. Each nation
adds to this mixture Its own vers ion of traditional diplomacy and modern variations
thereon. Almost all nations complete the
blend with a dash of the United Nations.
Of late. the role of the United Nations has
become less and less pronounced. Indeed,
with respect to VietNam the U . N. presence
Is scarcely discernible. It Is true that the distinguished Secretary-General. U Thant, has
taken public note of the confilct In VIetNam
and Its dangers to the world . The SecretaryGeneral Is a man of pence and an exceptional
diplomat. He has made clear that he Is more
than willing to place his dedica tion and his
skills at the disposal of the disputants In
Viet Nam. In his diplomatic r ole, he has
outlined views which might provide at some
points a basis !or a settlement of the confilet and he has, otherwise, sought tactfully
to engage the Interest of various parties In
a settlement.
With all due respect, however, the sincere
efforts of the Secretary-General are hardly
to be equated with bringing to bear on this
situation the potentials of the United Nations. VIet Nam Is, clearly, a breakdown In
the peace within the meaning of the Charter.
It contains, clearly, the threat of an expandIng war. With these characteristics, It would
appear that the contuct should long since
have triggered the utilization of every resource of the United Nations In an effort
to restore peace. Yet, I regret to say, that
apart from the personal efforts of the Secretary-General, the U.N. reaction to VietNam
has had something of the character of that of
a disinterested, enervated or Impotent onlookPr. It Is almoot as though the oonfilct In
VIet Nam were taking place not on the other
side of this planet but rathe: on some other
planet entirely.
It may be, of oourse, that the U . N. Is unable to make a contribution to peace In Viet
Nam. It may also be, however, that the !allure
to seek a contribution from the U . N . Is a
missing link In the restoration of peace In
VietNam.
Whatever may be Involved, the non- role
of the United Nations In this situation ought
not to go unnoticed. An embarrassed s ilence
1.s no longer a sufficient rooponse to the nation's needs or to the world's needs Urgent
though It Is, there Is more Involved In these
needs ev-en than ending the war In VIet Nam.
There le also at stake the prevention of a
more monstrous confilct. There le also at
stake the continued Cl'<Xllbllltv and utility

of what has heretofore been a fundamental
Instrument In the structure of world order.
In my judgment, It Is high time to !ace up
to the conspicuous absence o! the U.N. !rom
the VIetnamese dispute. We need to ask why,
when the need for a peace-el!ort Is maximal,
the output of the U.N. Is minimal. And we
need, at the same time, to explore every possibll1ty for the engagement of the organization In the el!ort to bring about a termlp.atlon of the hostilities in Viet Nam.
The U.N. was an essential element, among
others, In the Korean cease-fire. Why, then,

May 15, 1967

nlficant contribution to the restoration of
peace In Viet Nam. The Charter clearly Indicates that, veto or not, we should look
first to the Security Council. It may be valid
to assume that the Security Council Js less
useful as an Instrument of peace-keeping
when permanent powers are In disagreement.
But It Is not at all valid to assume that the
Security Council Is useless In those circumstances. That the Security Council may not
be able to play the central role In questions of
peace does not rule out 1ts playing o! any
role.

1t.3 inconsequence !n the problem of Viet

Whaever differences may separate them

Nam? In this connection, It Is manifest that
there have been strilctng changes In the
structure or the U.N. since the Korean confilet. Whatever their virtues, It may be that
these changes Inhibit the engagement of the
organization In VIetNam.
The most sweeping change, o! course, Is
that the U .N. has become a General Assembly-oriented organization at the same time,
that the membership has grown to over 120
states. It will be recalled that originally there
were 51 united nations. Among the present
members, there are, as there have been since
the outset, states-Infinitesimal and statesImmense and, in between, all of the gradations.
There are enormous differences of slgnl!lcance among these states Insofar as the
practical problems of maintaining peace are
concerned. Yet, all 120 have equal access to
ava!lable time In the General Assembly. All
120 have an equal share In the control of the
purse. All 120 have an equal vote In decisions of the Assembly.
It Is hardly an overstatement to note that
the structure of the General Assembly Is appallingly cumbersome. Nevertheless, the Assembly has made and It can continue to
make Important contributions of a longrange and peripheral nature to the strengthening of world peace. With all due respect,
however, there Is doubt that a body constituted as the General Assembly now Is can
play a slgnlfican~an executive-role In
dealing with Imminent threats of war or
In the re-establishment of a peace that has
broken down. In my judgment, the General
Assembly Is not competent for that purpose.
In my judgment, It Is delusive at this time,
to expect It to discharge functions o! a kind
which might be helpful In Viet Nam.
It Is conceivable that alterations In the
structure of the General Assembly might
remedy Its Inadequacies for peace-keeping or
peace-restoring purposes. Francis Plimpton,
a former U.S. representative to the U .N. was
right, perhaps, when he suggested that the
organization was In need of "family planning." It might be that the use of a single
spokesman for groups of small states would
be helpful. It might be, too, that the clusterIng of smaller states In to one vote on some
power-projected formula would be helpful
In Insuring fiscal responsibility and a measure of realism In the significant political decisions of that body. I have no doubt that
there are any number of technical changes
which, given sufficient time, can be absorbed
to great advantage In to the structure o! the
General Assembly.
But In all frankness, I must say that Insofar as Viet N am Is concerned, there Is not
a sufficient margin of time. Moreover, It Is
not at all certain that the kind of wholesale reconstitution o! the General Assembly
which would give It a peace-keeping function In Viet Nam and similar situations Is
either practical or desirable. As I have already noted, the General Assembly has other
u s eful, long-range and peripheral fun c tions
ot peace. Its value for those purposes should
not be jeopardized by projecting It Into situations for which It was not designed and
for which It would have to be severely reshaped If It Is to be effective.
It seems to me practical, therefore, to look
elsewhere In the U.N. structure !or a slg-

with respect to VIet Nam, the permanent
powers of the Security Council, I believe,
have all expressed their grave concern wl th
the situation and the urgent need to do
something about lt. That Is an entirely adequate basis, It seems to me, on which to
turn to the Council and seek from It a contribution to the restoration of peace In Viet
Nam.
Let me make clear that miracles are not to
be expected. All that can reasonably be asked
Is a wholehearted el!ort to do what can be
done to further peace. The least that should
be expected, or accepted, It seems to me, Is a
wllllngness on the part or the Council to
confront the Issue o! Viet Nam and to confront It soon.
One cannot foresee, of course, what can be
most helpfully done by the U.N. What ought
to be clear at this point, however, Is that
doing nothing In the U.N. has not helped In
VIet Nam. There are discernible lines of possible U .N. contribution which, it would seem,
warrant the fullest exploration.
One of these lines, for example, leads from
the Security Council to the International
Court. All of the combatants In Viet Nam
have affirmed, I belleve, the fundamental
relevance of the Geneva Accords of 1954 as
the basis for settlement o! the con.fllct. Certainly, the United States has done so.
We need to know, authoritatively and Impartially, what the requirements may be In
current circumstances !or the reassertlon of
the Geneva Accords as a legal basts !or a
restoration of peace. We need to know, too,
what must be done sooner or Jatar by all the
parties directly or Indirectly Involved In the
Vietnamese conflict to comply with the
Geneva Accords and so establish conditions
for a just and acceptable peace. In the circumstances, therefore, It might be useful for
the Security Council to ask an advisory opinIon of the International Court on these questions.
It would seem to me, too, that the Security
Council Is an appropriate setting tor a cards
on-the-table consideration of the present positions of all the participants--direct or lndlrec~and those deeply Interested in the
contuct In VIet Nam. Certain of the states
such as the United States, the Soviet Union
and France are present as permanent members of the Council. The problem of participation of the others Is not Insurmountable
In the light of the experiences In the Korean
case. In that Instance. It wlll be recalled, an
invitation was Issued to Peking-a nonmember of the U.N.-to come to the Security
Council and Peking did present Its case and
participate briefly In Its discussions.
It a consideration of the question o! Viet
Nam before the Security Council Is to have
maximum utility, there needs to be present
not only the Soviet Union, France, the United
States and other Securl ty Council members
but also China and North VIet Nam and the
National Liberation Front, as well as Saigon.
In a confrontation or this kind, we may begin, at last, to understand whether It Is distrust, disinclination, disdain, density, or
whatever which has so far stood In the way
of negotiations for an honorable settlement.
We may begin, at last, to measure rather
than guess the gap which must be bridged
In the restoration of peace In VIet Nam.
To be sure, the prospects o! a refusal of
the Invitation are obvious. To be sure, the
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pro
ls, that v.e do not expect
mlracl , that we keep our heads, and
that '\loe do not indulge 1n personal!U
In closing, I emphasize that the reponslbiUty for the conduct of our Nation's foreign affair is v ted 1n the
Pr !dent of the United States Whether
v.e a r 'l\1th him or dlsagr , '1\hether
hP plea cs or d.lsplen s us, v.lll not
Ugh n one Iota the onerous burdens
'1\hlch rest on his shoulders as a result
of the VIetnam confilct The PI csldent
may look for advice to his aides 1n the
executive branch. He may look to the
Senate and to the people of this Nation
Whether or not advice Is forthcoming,
whether or not there Is consent to his
cour e, the President still must decide
v.hat he believes to be in the best Int-er ts of the United States. That Is his
r ponslblllty. He cannot share It He can
only assume It on behalf of all of us
In this most perilous hour, Mr. President, 1 thlnk the President needs and
should have our understanding, our
help, our prayers, and the support which
can be given to him In good conscience.
It ought to be borne In mind at all times
that whatever contribution this Nation
can make to a peaceful settlement In
Vietnam, that contribution can only be
made and w!JI be made on behalf of all
of us, In the end, by the President of the
United States. So I would hope, Mr.
President, that this suggi'Stlon. made
first at Johns Hopkins, later repeated at
the University of North Carolina, and
still later at The Temple 1n Cleveland,
a suggestion made originally by the distmgulshed senior S-enator from Oregon
!Mr. MORSEl and others, that we go to
the Security Council. and that we ask
the U.N. to face up to Its re~ponslbllltles,
will be taken to heart by the ndmlnlstratlon, and that some action along these
Jines v.·!JI get underway. As I have said
before, the hour is growing late. There
Is not too much time left.
ExlllBIT

1

\"IETNAM AND Til& UNITED NATIONS

(Address by Senator MIKE MANSI'U:X.D, Democrat, of Montana, .Johns Hopkins Unlve.rslty, the George Huntington Williams
Memortnl Lecture, Nov, 10, 1966)
I ha'l'e come h~re from two weeks of pollt1ca In Montana EII!<:Uon.s In my State
usually Involve a great deal of personal uchango w1th voters. Tbls year was no exception. Although not running myself, I found
the campalgn aa Intensive as Montana Ia
extensive. It carried Me Into confrontntlon
w1th many. many Americans over a troll of
thousands or Inllee I had occasion to speak
to Montanana on the range, In the hi h
mountains, along the roods, at ranch and
resen-atlon, and In vlllage, town. and dty.
Polltleal campaigning Is not as It might
appar to be an exhausting pursuit On the
contrary at least to the polltleally nsltlzed,
It Ia a kind of restorative It reactivate the
ability to dllrerenUate between what Is ImportAnt and what Is grossly o er-rated tn
the public a.ll'alra or the nation Tbat essential penpect.lve may I say Is frequently distorted ln the political prtsms or Wa.ahtngton
.\ campaign may be d lgned to lntonn
the votM" but It 1so lnt l'tl18 the campaigner
lt unfolds the deep dlsquleta aa well u the
h
whlch move In tbe political substructure of the nation
h ectl n camp gn,
In l<hort.. Is a rcdi!K'O cry of tbe hUIIUUl aide
o! Am rtcan public l•Je
1 meet w1th you treab from an e>:posure
to a c:roa-aectlon 1 Amer an senUment u
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It ulsta In Montana where the frost hu lo
on the pum,pkln and tb ano
0! wtnalready begun to
t.her l m t
wtth )'OU still strongly aetud wtth what 11
c1 est to the h
t of the peop e of m St.a te
I have found tn 26 yean of pub c life that
on tund~~.mental matters
ertl Is n t much
d1lrerence between a
ntanan outlook and
the nat.lorml outlook I U&Ume. therefore
t.hat the bMic oonc rll8 of the people of
Mont.ann are your baalc concerns Just M bnalc
ho
are also probably similar. In short, I
nssume that what Ia moat Important In Mon·
tana Is also likely to be moat Important here
In that .eln, I Wls.h that I might say thM
the legislative record of the 8 th Congress
or some speclftc upect of It Is of fundamental
Interest to Americana at this time As you
know, the Senate and House de It v;lth a
gre t range of public problems during the
past two years. Tbe&c problems havtng accumulated o.er a long tlme, had arisen to
chAllenge not only the stability of the nation's political and social atructur but even
the adequacy of the nation's phySical environment
In my Judgment, a very substantial legislative base hw; now been lnld for mcctln these
problems. Tbe record of the 89th C)ngress Is
Indeed. extraordinary In scope. Tbc cognomen, "Great Congress" may well be apt In
any event, as a parllclptult, I should like to
tblnk so.
Yet, In all honesty, I cannot claim that t.he
legislative achievements of these two yeara
are n response to what Is m t basic In the
concerns and hopes of the people or the nation. I regret to say thnt theee acnlevements,
however slgnUlcant, r.re obscured In the
shadow which VIet NIUil luui cast over every
n peet of the life of the nation
The preoccupation of Americans remains
VIet Na.m and Ita Implication. E'cry day,
these Implications grow more persorml and
direct for more youth and their flllllllles. Tbe
wa.r Is clearly the nexus of the national
anxiety. And peace lies at the heart o! the
nation's hopes; peace--Ita honorable restoration at the earliest poSEible moment.
I know that you hrn-e heard a great deal
or VIet Nam over many months It Is a subJect from whlch you might welcome a mea£-.
ure of surcease. By the same token, I would
prefer to oonslder some other lesa vexing
question, perhapB even the outcome of the
election. Yet I am Impelled to return •" thla
critical matter tonight.
As you may know, problems of foreign relation shave concerned me for many years and,
out of that concern, I have frequently addressed myself to the VIetnamese question.
1\fy views on the situation there are generally
known and I do not Intend to repeat them
In detail here. Certainly, I have said time and
aga!n-ln public statements as v;ell as In the
prtvate councils of the government--that It
does not matter much, at this late date, ~!lw
we became Involved In VIet Nam. Tbe point
Is that we are Involved, deeply lnvoh d, and
we cannot and we wlll not w1thdraw In the
absence or an honorable settlement of tbls
question Nevertheless, I believe (and I have
so stated many times) that It would be to
tbe benefit of all concerned 1! there could
be an lmmecUatc contraction of the hootlllt:ea
and, as ooon as poe31blc thereafter their mplete teiTnlnn tlon
I have long ~n persUaded tha tb,. In·
tor ts of the U nlt.ed States ca
ortzc us aa
a Pa.c1flc power but that th.oee 1ntereetll Dl06•
certainly do not eotn~nt:nd to us tb roe 0!
Asian power. As a Paclflc power rather than
&n A&lnn power (and the two are aometlm
contused) It Is, In my Judgment v;ho y In
our national lntcest to remo e Amcrl.can
military Installations and forces from the
entire Soutbeo.l!t Aa1An mainland as .IIOOll
as that can be dono--e.s aoon ae an honomb e
e Is B6SUl'ed
y I say that that 'lev. a.ooords w1th the
President's proclaimed purpoee In VIe
am
whlch Ia a <;ettlement achle ed by n

~n

tu hav
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POLICY
(Address by Senator MIKE MANSFIELD, Democrat, of Montana, before the Carolina
Forum, the University of North Carolina,
Chapel Hill, N.C., Mar. 13, 1967)
Prior to my corning to Congress a quarter
of a century ago, I thought my stock of
solutions to the questions o! foreign pol!cy
was quite adequate. In !act, as a teacher of
history at the University of Montana, which
I was, I had a touch o! what Senator Fulbrlght mlght call the arrogance of brain
power. In more oommon Idiom, there were
time when I thought I knew It all. That
may I say, Is a falling common to exceptional
historians, from Herodotus to Schlesinger.
As a new Member of Congress, my background In history was highly useful. I also

full of years. At this point In time, I must
confess that I find a system o! seniority
tolerably comfortable.
For the present, I have no hesitancy In
Invoking the authority with which seniority
endows me, In order that I may speak to
you on what seems to me to be the central
concerns o! contemporary American foreign
policy. Since the end of World War II, I
have watched clusters of international problems coalesce Into these concerns. Tbe problems cover a whole range of new and tumultuous change. Tbey are, In part, Ironic byproducts of the Immense acceleration o!
development In science, education and communication, transportation and other technologies. Tbey are expressive o! the explosl<>n
In population as well a.s the explosion o!
nuclear devices. Tbey are Indicative of the
growth of human expectations and, hopefully, of human enlightenment. Tbey are
problems, however, which despite these new
twists, are stlll undergirded by the vast
heritage of human Ignorance, fear, want, and
hostility from which no part of the globe,
is free.
The Iceberg of change which has moved
In International affairs during the past two
decades helps to explain the emergence o!
the U.N. and other International organizations. It Is relevant to the social !nstab!ll ty
and the militarism which have largely followed the ending of 19th century colonial
era, notably In Africa. It is Involved In the
Asian catacylsrns--the great economic stirrings In Japan, the immense uncertainties
which brood over India and Pakistan and the
political tidal waves which, at intervals, have
rolled through Chinese society.
The many-sided changes In the human
condition during the past two decades also
explain the first military alliance In peacetime between ourselves and Western Europe
as well as the first major military Involvements o! the United States on the Asian
mainland. They help to explain, finally, the
awakening o! this nation to the problems

discovered, however, that my knowledge of

which confront the world and ourselves as

quacy but for excess.

international affairs did not go very far.

participants In Its lndlvislble destiny.
It used to be that we tended to stand
apart and aloof from the affairs of the rest
of the globe. Some have called that period of
our history whlch led up to World War II,
the age of Isolation. The characterization is
glib and somewhat misleading. We were not
so much isolated as we were Insulated by a
fortuitous geographic endowment. The greater part of the nation's historic energies,
therefore, could, and fortunately did. go Inward Into the development of a rich, ample,
and sparsely settled land. We had little
need or Inclination which would stimulate us
to look much beyond this endowment !or
our needs and-!! I may use the term-for
our kicks. Except to sustain a limited curlooity and to satisfy a few exotic wants, we
avoided an extensl ve overseas projection of
American power, particularly outside the
Western Hemisphere. From a distance, we
were content to hold ourselves up to the rest
of the world, on the basis of great material
achievements and the political heritage o!
the American Revolution, as a prime exa.fnple
of the perfectablllty of the national experience.
Since World War II, however, we have
found ourselves plunged, hands, feet, and
head into the mainstream of the world's affairs. We did not seek this role. We did not
want it. Most o! us still find the clothes
o! a great International power, costly, lll-flttlng and uncomfortable. Nevertheless, we are
unable to get out or them. There is even the
probability that some o! us have learned not
only to tolerate this new garb, but to !Ike
lt.
In any event, as a sequel to World War II.
this nation has come onto the' center o! the
stage o! International affairs. In this leading
role we have expended an immense amount
o! resources, energy, and money for a great
variety of purposes. We have developed all

It wlll serve no useful purpose to continue
to measure these reflexes o! policy by the
sort o! generalltles which are expressed by
the terms "Isolationism" or "lnternatlonallsm." Whatever may have been the case years
ago, these yardsticks have long since lost
their pertinence. The labels are no guarantee
of the efficacy of any course of action or nonaction In International relations What Is
essential Is not the name. What is essential
is that the course Is timely and adjusts the
bonafide interests of the nation to the realities of the contemporary world.
I speak In all candor when I say that there
have been tendencies under both Democratic
and Republican administrations for foreign
policy to lag behind these realities. Until recently, a kind of Inertia, for example, has
ex1sted with regard to one of the central
concerns o! American foreign rollcy the
Unl ted States-Soviet con!ron tatlon in Europe. Until recently, we have been most reluctant to bring ourselves to face, In policy,
the changes which have taken place on that
continent.
To be sure, President Eisenhower sought
In his administration to restore at least a
measure of clvillty in the conduct of U.S.Sovlet affairs, by his personal associ a tlons
with the leaders o! the Soviet Union. To be
sure, President Kennedy, In the Nuclear Test
Ban Treaty, removed a rigidity which, !or
years had decreed that ag"eements should not
be concluded with the Soviet Union. It has
only been in the last year or two, however,
that as a nation we have begun to explore
fully the Implications o! change In Europe
and to react to Its potentialities In terms o!
our Interests and world peace.
Yet substantial change has been manifest
!or some time In Inner developments In both
Eastern Europe and ln Western Europe and
between the two regions. In Eastern Europe,
the immediate postwar Isolation from the

prospects o! a high declble of propaganda
and Invective, I! the Invitations are accepted,
are equally obvious. But these are risks
which can readily be sustained when the
stakes !or all concerned are as high a.s they
are In VIet Nam. Insofar as the United States
Is concerned, It le In the Interest of this nation to welcome the confrontation. The open
bar o! world opinion Is one before which we
must never hesitate or !ear to place this
nation's policies.
The courses which I have Indicated are
llustratlve of the poosibll1tles of using the
untapped resource<~ of the United Nations
to advance towards peace In VIet Nam. They
may or may not be relevant at this time.
A vigorous effort on the part of the U.N. may
prove a.s futile as all other efforts to date,
military and non-rnllltary, to terminate the
conflict. But with the world enmshed In the
most dangerous lntemational situation since
Korea, we must seek by every avenue to fa.c!lltate the restoration of a just peace In Viet
Nam. We owe that to the unfortunate people
of that nation, to ourselves and to the world.
ExHIBIT 2
CENTRAL CONCERNS OF AMERICAN FOREIGN

It did not begin to provide much of an under-

standing, let alone answers, to the critical
issues which were emerging as World War II
drew to a clooe. In those days, most of us
In government suffered from serious Imperfections In our not.lons of the outside world
and widely-held but unfounded hopes !or
an automatic postwar peace under the United
Nations.
We took many wrong tacks along with the
right ones In the course o! our foreign poHcy.
For many decades to come, historians will
be engaged In sorting out the one from the
other. We made mistakes In Asia. We made
them In Europe. We made them In the UnLted
Nat.lons. We made them over the whole range
o! emerging new International issues.
I, for one, felt my limitations and recognized the need to become a student again.
My classroom was Congress, in Committee
and on the floor. My extracurricular activity
Included a great deal of foreign travel, extensive reading and not a little reflection.
To this day, a student I have remained; an
expert I am not; and teaching is the profession to which, at some point, I may return.
In the latter connection, I should note that
my name Is stlll carried, on leave of absence
on the rooter o! the University o! Montana:
Moreover, thanks to a seniority system In
college teaching. second not even to that or
the Congress, I now hold the rank o! full
Professor of History.
I am constrained to point out that teachIng and legislating are the two outstanding
examples in AmeriCan society o! the application o! a major tenet of Confucianism; that
the accumulation of years 1.s to be equatec:
automatically and unquest!onlngly with the
accumulation o! wisdom. Tbls principle. I
know, Is Insufferable to the young tolerable
to the middle-aged, and a comfort to those

manner of costly Intelligence and ln!orrnatlonal services. We have developed towering
military services whose annual cost Is now
around $70 billion.
We have fought one war In Asia, and are
now engaged In a second. We have narrowly
missed Involvement In several other peripheral clashes elsewhere. More than twenty
years after World War II, we still have something on the order of agreements !or mutual
security with 40 or more nations. These
agreements, In effect, are commitments to
mllltary action everywhere on the globe, except, perhaps, the Antarctic. The strategic
air force Is on a minutes-alert. Intercontinental and other missiles are pre-set for
Instant retallatory launching. Day and night
the American navy patrols the seven seas.
American soldiers are stationed In many nations abroad; In Europe and VIet Nam, they
number In the hundreds of thousands.
These far-fiung commitments have been
questioned from time to time. In my Judgment, It is most proper that pertinent questions be raised about them. Not only do they
Involve great expenditures of publlc funds,
they carry, at all times, immense Implications for the very survival o! the nation and
clvlllzatlon. As I see It, we have undertaken
so many and scattered defense obiiga tlons
that any need !or the simultaneous honoring
o! a group of these commitments would find
us hard-pressE'd to provide even a llmi ted response. For that reason, l! for no other, 1t
seems to me we would be well-advised to look
closely at these military commitments and
activities and to weigh carefully their con temporary value.
It would be futile, however, to consider
them In a vacuum. Effective surveillance
must relate to the central concerns o! our
foreign pollcy wl\.lch, presumably, gave rise
to them In the first place. It behooves us to
see as clearly as possible whether our understanding of these concerns Is up to date. It
Is Incumbent upon us to test and test again
the reflexes of our policies not only for ade-
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o: human e e:gy t.o meet the m.a&aln denuwds o: p. t-war reoonstru uon.
p«Jally n
the death of
lin, howevCT,
there baa been a
nernl loosenln of the
ldoologlcal and othtt at.ralt-Jac:kel.a through·
out Enatern Europe There haa also been a
growing r ponae on the part or ov mmenta
thtte t.o consumer needs, tbc a Ua!act on or
which lnvol<'es greatly expanded comm rce
wllh the non-C'.ommunlst world
Aa lndlc the o: the bre:u!th or change,
communlcaUOD4, travel, cultural rxchange
and other contacts have grown rapidly be·
tween F MLem and We tern Europe The rl e
or trade Ieala betw n the two regloiUI bns
been very pronounc~ and It should be noted
that, Berlin Wall notwithsta.ndlng W t Germany lends all other non-Communist nations In commerce with F.a.aUrn Europe
For th~e who read the ten lea""' ot omclal
IIOCinln.blllty, moreover, I would call attention
t.o the recent \isll.a of President l'odgorny or
tho Soviet Union to Italy and the first rr<:cp·
tlon ot a Chic! or that State by the Pope, u
well a.a Premier Kosygtn'a warm rr<:eptlons In
Paris and London One may attach such
values &.a he choo&ea to the&e e>enl.a. The
facts o! change In Europe, bowe,·er, speak
for thernsel vea. The talk o! war aubsld!es; the
sounds of lntrn-European cooperation a.re
hen.rd more clearly on all sides The European
detente has not only begun, It Is already well
advanced.
Our reaction to change In Europe Includes
the groundwork o! PrP.sldrnt Eisenhower and
President Kennedy a.a well ns the bridgebuilding or President Johnson nil or which
I have already mentioned ,
What Is Involved In the !attn case Is a
•ustalned effort In the direction o! restoring
normalcy to our relations with the Sov1et
Union and a s!gnltlcant reduction ln the
m!lltn.ry rl\'alry which, wittingly or unwittingly, could lead to a catastrophic confilet.
A number o! s!gn!tlcrmt agreements with
the Soviet Union are already Involved In this
effort. They deal with cultural exchanges,
consulnr questions, commerclnl aviation, and
the peaceful use or outer space. Negotiations
nre also anticipated, In the near future, to
try to llmlt the Incredibly costly rh"Biry or
adding successive and reciprocal "anUs" to
the ballistic missile systems o! each nation.
An attempt l.s also likely to be made to remove certain long-standing and self-Imposed
hindrances In law to our peaceful trade "1tb
the Eastern European countries.
Many or these measures, or course, Involve not only the President but also action
by the Congress nnd, partlculn.r!y, by the
Senate. And, certainly, they Involve underBtn.nd!ng on the part Of the people Of the
nation. However, emot!ona run deep on any
question o! U.S. relatlon.s with Communist
nations, particularly, In the light or the
bloody conftict In VIet Nam. I am !rank to
say that I have my own reticences about the
pursult or agreemenl.s with nations on one
side or the globe, while a war against us
Is being waged with tbelr help on the other.
The best Judgments we can obtain, however,
tell us that the rejection or the contemplated
agreements with the Soviet Union nod Ea.stern Europe wtll not make the allghtest dlf!erence In the situation In \'let Nam It wlll.
ln no way, diminish our casualties or hasten
the conclusion of the con111ct.
In tboee clrcumatances, I do not see that
It aervee our purpoees to turn our backs on
agreements which would otherwise be In the
lntereet o! this nation I do not see that we
&dva.nce the cauae ot peace by re!ustng to
build more stable relaUone !or peace whenever and wherever an cppcrtunlty to do ao
preeenta Itself.
MOrt'Onr, brldge-bulldl.ng to Ea.stern Europe Ia not unrelated t.o the poulbiUty or
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begrudge one cent o! th
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persUAded that the x d!v
s nt!al to p.eace In Europe tod y
,.ere bellc•ed to be when dl p tched
yut11 ago
But 18 ~bat the
Uoned the change ln U e g
tn Europe which expr
Itself In a rapidly
groW1ng tnule and the cxp:ms n o! other
friendly relatlOIUI It shou d also be noted
that within Western Europe, th re are ob' !ous doubl.a a.bout the ne~ r r the m:.lntcna.nce o! N.A To nt the strength In which
It was previously projected Indeed, the
French no longer sec any requirement tor
the presence or U.S !ore , at lel>'t no In
I'rance, nnd they have withdrawn their ov;n
detachments !rom N A T 0. Command The
United Kingdom has reduced 11.8 commitment
or men and resources to the Continent and
hna announced further reductions unless
WC6t Germany La prepared to neutrallze the
exchange C08ts or m:.lntn!nlng these forces
on the Rhine Other \'/estern Europeans to
a greater or lesser degree appear to regard
their NAT 0. commitments In the same nonurgent fashion
It Is now ,·ery evident that the United
States c.lone has felt deeply the need to sustain the full military burden ot the eo.rller
common commitment to NAT 0 Our all.es
In Western Europe are much cl06cr to the
firing line; yet, In n period of unprecedented
economic prOI'pcr!ty they arc most unwilling
to carry their pledged share. In effect, the
Wcstocn I:.'uroprans have mnde adjustments
In their commitments to NAT 0 to rctlect
0' er-nll changes In Europe and they have
ma.de these a.dJustments unllnterally,
'Ibe contrast In performance between ourselves and Western Europe regarding commitments toN A T.O tn my Judgment Is be·
coming almoot an embarrassment. It moves
us apart !rom the malnstrcam or European
developments and La likely to become n source
or !rlctlon on both sides which, tn the end,
can only be harmful to the Inter ts of both
sides.
In all !ranknC68, I :O.nd It dliDcult to acquiesce ln Executl>e Branch rears !or Western Europe's safety which are obviously r:ugreater than the fear o! the Europeans tbcm•ch·es. In all !ra.nkne&s, I find BOrne lnck O!
dlgnlty In the lengths to whlcb these !ears
have carried our diplomacy. We ha>e begged,
badgered a.nd buttered Western Europe In
an effort to at!muiatc a greater contribution
to N.A.T.O. In all fran.knC38, I did not relish
this nation having been pl.a.ced In the position or wearing out Ita v.elcome !u France.
I should not llke to see thnt experience repeated elsewhere In Europe Yet It may well
be repeated unless there Is a willingness to
ma.ke timely a.djustmenta.
I have, therefore, joined wltb 43 other
Senators In the Introduction of a resoluUon
which recommends to the President that the
Executh·e Branch make substantial reductions ln the present deployment or C'ur forces
In Western Europe Personally, I have !elt
tor several yeat11 that. t"o or three rather
than alx dlvtalons would be more than su!flclent to undenrcore our adherence to the
North Atlantic Treatv That figur Ia ln line
with estimates or present need ,.b'cb have
been advanced by General Elscnbower and
General Gavin, both or whom have had •
lon association with this quea • n I :O.nd
It morst dLmcult t.o romprebend why two
d!Vl.s!ona are any leas e'"ectlve than alx In
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Within Ch.lna, during th .,. yMrs !.here
have ~n momentous e•ents which hnvc also
added to the dlmcult!ea and uncertalntl,.
or developing a cohesive policy tow1U'da the
Chlnet.- mainland The Chin
have <X·
ploded nucle.'>r devlcr.a nt I..op Nor In the
Western Asian desert or Slnkb.ng !!< cr.nt
Ideological con1l!cts have sent great tr<·mors
through the whole or the Inn•,- political
structure or China There lull been, llnnlly
the great cleav ge In Sino-Soviet re,olut!onary solidarity which hna tom np:>.rt atmoot all or the relationships between th.e
tw.:> giant nations o! the F.uru!an Continent
In the context of these "' rnl.8, It Is n t
rurprlslng that the dust. !or the settlement
of wblcb American policy baa waited eighteen ye:>ra Is benv1er than ever The obscurity,
moreover, Ia not likely to be dlspell~ In the
n r rut re Th~re Is nothing In the recent
history o! China ,. hlcb sugg 1.a that It wll!
be euler tomorrow than It Is today tor us to
see cl rly & direction for ellectlve policy
Whatever course or ~rlc;J,n relntloiUI with
China, It "'Ill have to be pursued In spite or
the dust with which the s!tuntton Ia co er~
C'Jear-eut cbolcea cannot be expected to b
avallnble to us any time tn the !or e b e
future On the contrary, .American decl.stona
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respecting ChinA must tnev!tably contal.n a
larg~ measure o! subjectivity and prayer.
Ever-present, WUl be the posslbU!ty of error.
These considerations, may I say, apply not
only to wbat we may do respecting China but
to what we do not do. The uncertainties and
the risks exist no less In the principle or
non-approach to which we have adhered
over these years of our times. History will
someday estimate the contribution of this
prtnc!ple-lts addition to or subtraction
from the Interests of the United States and
the stab!'!ty and peace o! the Western
Pac ftc.
Under the present approach. !or example,
we know from a distance that a great fire
rages In the core o! Chinese Communism.
The man!!esta.t!ons are plain 1n the roars
of the Red Guards, In the denunciations and
counter-denunciations, In the sudden fall o!
long-estsblished revolutionaries. They are
documented In the Inflammatory Ideographs
which are slashed over the streets and walls
of Peking and the other citadels of Chinese
Communist power. They are suggested In the
polltlcal bewilderment which Is seen In
coastal cities and In the provinces along the
Inner borders of China and other remote
arens.
Indeed, the present turmoil is such as to
make clear that Communist political control
which, for nearly two decades, was held by
many to be total and Irreversible and to extend all the way from MoSCO'V to the farthest
reaches of China is actually considerably less
than absolute, even In Its extension from
Peking to the distant Chinese pro\1nces.
We can also note. from afar. the serious
difficulties between the Soviet Union and
China. The strains have long been explicit
In the Ideological realm. They have alw become Increasingly evident In the tension
along the Sino-Soviet frontier which runs
!or thousands o! miles between the two
countries. What appears Involved here Is an
expression of the historic projection or
Czarist Russian Interests across the Asian
mainland towards Alaska and which, before
It receded to more tractable limits, had
spread even as far as California and Hawaii.
This basic Russian projection to the East
persists and rubs against China, at least In
border regions of Manchuria, Mongolia, and
In Sink!ang Province. Conversely, an historic
Chinese Interest remains in many parts or
Soviet Asia which at various times have been
under at least nominal Chinese authority.
The clash or national Interests of the two
nations, in short, Is very real and so, too, are
the Irredentist host!l!tles which It engenders.
These hostilities have been a mnjor element
In the cycle or ever-Increasing bltternesB In
Chinese-Soviet relations over the past few
years. How long this cycle w!ll last and how
It wtll end a.re matters of conjecture. Whatever the posslb!l!t!es. if any, of more etrect!ve
adjustment or our pollcles in the llght of this
and other trends, however, we a.re inhibited
from their pursuit by our current approach
or, rather, non-approach to mainland China.
Let me turn, finally, to the immediate and
over-rld1ng problem of policy, to the situation In VIet Nam. VIet Nam atrecte every
other upect o! our foreign relations and,
particula.rly, the two central ooncerns. It diminishes our capacity to deal oonstruct!vely
with the United States- Soviet confrontation
In Europe. To put It mildly, it multiplies the
problems of the oon!rontatlon wtth China
1n Asia.
It Is ironic that once again In Viet Nam,
M in Korea. a country so small and remote
from our interest<~ as to be outside the range
or even public curiosity a few years ago ha.a
become the major preoccupation of the
United States. It Is Ironic that, !or the second time in a generation, we find ourselves 1n
a devastating war on the borders o! Chlna-not with China-but with a people who have
had no tradition o! hostility towards the
United States and who have !a.r more hietorte reason than do we !or mutual hootlllty
with the Chinese.

How deeply we are engaged 1n this Ironic
situation Is indicated by the current concentration of United States military force In
Southeast Asia and, particularly, In VIetNam.
We have well 1n excess of 400.000 millta.ry
personnel on the ground in South Viet Nam.
There are also approximately 75,000 men on
the 7th Fleet in adJacent waters and 35,000
more in Thailand wtth responsibilities that
are tied closely Into the situation In Viet
Nam. In short, wa have committed to this
oontllct over 500,000 members or the Armed
Services and materiel and equipment in unprecedented quantities and this Immense
consignment Is supported by additional mllltary strength o! all kinds on Okinawa, the
Ph!l!pp!nes, and Guam.
We a.re in a limited war In which, by becoming deeply engaged, we have managed to
save !rom collapse the government o! South
Viet Nam In Saigon. The objectives of our
military engagement are confined entirely to
the southern half o! VIetNam. This llmlted
wa.r of limited objectives, nevertheless, ha.s
already engaged more American forces than
Korea. It has cost more than Korea. It has
Incurred plane and hellcopter losses greatly
In excess o! those In Korea. It Is a more difficult and dangerous war than ~area. It Is a
more bitter and barbaric wa.r. It Is a war
whose end is not yet in sight, by military
action or by a negotiated diplomatic solution.
That Is the reality or the situation in VIet
Nam. The more candidly it is faced the better
off we wlll be. At this point, the question of
how or why we became Involved is moot and
so are regrets over our involvement. In my
judgment, the question now Is how can this
war be ended at the soonest possible moment in afi honorable peace tor ourselves
and !or all deeply enmeshed in !t. In short,
the question is how can It be ended under
honorable circumstances, before the spreadIng devastation, not only In North VIet Nam,
but even more, In South VIet Nam, makes a
hideous mockery of the original objective of
helping the VIetnamese people.
I do not belleve that we can end this war
by slogans o! "get In or get out." It cannot
be endeii by personal criticism o! the President and the Vice President, Ambassador
Goldberg and other leaders of the Administration or members o! the Senate, regardless
of the positions which they take on this issue.
I am !rank to say that this crttlclsm, a~
times, goes far beyond the merely ungracious
and borders on the d!sgracerul. President
Johnson wants this war ended 1n an honorable peace and every Senator I know, and I
know them all, wants the same thing. I!
there a.re differences among us they a.re differences o! understanding, Interpretation,
and method.
In my persona.! view, and have made It
clear many times, the contllct cannot be
terminated In an honorable fashion by a
withdrawal or the United States at this time
although an honorable settlement must
eventually involve the withdrawal or United
States forces.
The only practical avenue which I see
open, for the present, Is to seek to mitigate
the horror o! the conflict and to restrain Its
spread, while endeavoring to pursue any avenue, byway, route or whatever, a.s the President haa sought to do, which might lead to
the negotiating table. That there has not
yet been an initiation or substantial contact tor peace Is no argument against the
continuance o! the effort to make that contact. There can be no relaxation until the
war Is brought to an end In negotiations. It
ts essential that we pursue peace in VietNam
in all s!ncerl ty and with au diligence not only
because, In this situation, peace has a rational and moral validity, but also because a
prompt settlement Is 1n the Interests of the
Vietnamese people and the interests of the
American people.
I must say, with great regret, that s!gn.s
or a settlement 1n the near future are lacking. There is, Instead, the !act or an ugly
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war or spreading devastation. All the while,
the options a.re runntng out; the alternatives which might lead to negotiations grow
!ewer.
Many proposals have been put forth and
rnnny have been explored. As an example,
over the past year or more I have publicly
called attention to these possible easements
o! the s! tuatlon and !or ~entual settlement:
1. In lieu or aerial bombardment or North
VIet Narn, the sealing off of the borders of
the 17th parallel, through Laos;
2. A reconvening of the Geneva Conference
on the basis or the 1954 and 1962 agreements by call or ti1e cochairmen, the United
Kingdom and the Soviet Union, or by any
participating conferees;
3. An all-Asian conference at Rangoon or
Tokyo or any other suitable location to consider the conditions or an honorable peace;
4. The Inc! us!on in any peace conference
of whatever belligerents may be necessary
to br1ng about a termination or the conflict
In VietNam;
5. An enlargement of the Manna Conference of 1966 into a follow-up conference, to
include friend and foe alike;
6. A race-to-!ace meeting or the Secretary
of State, Dean Rusk, and the Foreign MinIster o! the Peking government to discuss
the restoration of peace in VIet Nam.
In addition, I have urged that the closest
consldertalon be given to Informed French
views on VIet Nam and to the views or the
Cambodian Premier, Prince Noroctom Sihanouk. I have urged that the proposals of U
Thant and Mrs. Gandhi be considered. I have
endorsed various statements or the President, Secretary Rusk, and Ambassador Goldberg, all of which have made clear that not
only our proposals but also those of Hanoi
and the People's Liberation Front might provide a basis !or settlement. I have recommended tR.at there be not just a cessa t!on
of the bombing of North VIet Nam but that
all killing stop, on both sides, In a ceasefire and standfast, on the ground and In
the waters adjacent to VIet Nam as well as
over Viet Narn, to the end that efforts may
be made to initiate talks.
In some or these proposals, the President
has concurred and has had them pursued by
his diplomats. All or them, he has had
examined and if they have not been pursued, I can only conclude that there have
been sound reasons for not pursuing them.
Suggestions for peace have come from many
sources; the actual pursu! t of peace in the
past year, however, has been by diplomacy
and, largely, by secret diplomacy. Indeed,
that Is t!le case even with the efforts or the
distinguished Secretary General or the
United Nations, U Thant. In his attempts to
bring about peaoe in VIet Nam, U Thant
has acted in his personal and diplomatic
capacity rather than 1n hl.s Secretarial capacIty of carrying out organizational decisions
or the United Nations.
The !act Is that the U.N., as an organization, has not yet entered into the VIetnamese
problem. Some limited use of the U.N. In this
fashion, may I say, was proposed In an address which I delivered at Johns Hopkins
University in November, 1966. At the time,
it was not suggested that the United Nations be brought directly into the substance
of the dispute; that cou"e presents great
difficulties because neither North Viet Nam
nor China a.re member states. What I did
suggest, however, was an entirely proper and
preceden ted procedural 1n! tia ti ve by the
United Nations. The Security Council can
Issue, at any time, by majority vote a call
to all belligerents In Viet Nam to convene
In Its forum. It would be entirely In order
tor an Invitation o! this kind to Include
both China and North Viet Nam.
It was further suggested last November
that a basis :ior a negotiated settlement could
begin to be sought In a Security Council request to the International Court !or an advisory opinion on the appllcablllty o! the
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that were the operative provisions or a. number of these commitments to come Into play
simultaneously, our ability to discharge
them, short of nuclear confla.gra.tlon, would
be most doubtful.
In my judgment, all outstanding military
commltments and activities ought to be
subject to continuous scrutiny as to their
current validity. From time to time we close
surplus ml!1ta.ry bases at home. We ought
not to be reluctant, In any sense, to reduce
costly commitments abroad just as rapidly
as their utlllty becomes questionable and
their foreign pollcy purposes obsolete.
In this connection, I would note the large
U.S. mil!tary deployment In Europe. For a.
number of years, six U.S. divisions have been
stationed In Western Europe under NATO.
These forces plus dependents add up to a
quasi-permanent military establishment In
Europe of over half a m!Jllon Americans.
The annual outlay for this commitment
amounts to b!lllons of do!Jars. Many have
urged a. reduction of the deployment on the
basis or cost or the gold drain and balance
of payments dlfficultles or because of the
competing needs of Viet Nam. The costs of
the European deployment, to be sure, are a
pressure on the domestic economy and the
International position of the dollar. The expanding war In VIet Nam, to be sure, Is a.n
open pit In terms of Its ever-growing requirements for men, sk.llls, and materiel.
However, the critical Issue with respect to
the U.S. deployment on European soU Is not,
In my Judgment, a financial one; nor Is It the
competing needs of Viet Nam. It we require
the present level of forces In Europe, the
nation can find a. way to deal with the financial and other difficulties which may be Involved. The Issue Is whether our security, the
security of the North Atlantic region and the
security of Western Europe-twenty years
after World War !!--continue to compel the
concentration or six American dlvlslons on
tho other side of the Atlantic.
What Is Involved here Is the accuracy of
our current estimates of one of the critical
components of our foreign policy. We need
to ask ourselves whether conditions In Europe have changed since NATO was established. We need to ask ourselves whether the
present level of the American commltmen t
Is out of step with that change.
Let us not delude ourselves; while our
military deployment under NATO has not
changed for many years, circumstances In
Europe have changed greatly In recent years.
They have changed In Russia and Eastern
Europe. They have changed In Germany and
Western Europe. When the troop commitment to NATO was assumed, the keynote of
relations between the Soviet East and Western Europe was one o! mutual suspicion and
hostlllty. That Is not the case now. Today,
the tone of Intra-European relations has the
ring of a reasonableness that borders on
cordlallty.
Vice President Humphrey, on returning
from his recent trip to Western Europe, was
quoted as predicting that In 20 years the Iron
Curtain would be replaced with an open
door. Whatever the situation may be two
decades hence, I venture to suggest, today,
two decades after World War II, that the
door Is already much more than sllghtly ajar,
as between Eastern and Western Europe.
The change ln the general climate Jn Europe Is reflected In the attitudes of the Western Europeans toward NATO. At one time,
the European allles joined with us tn a w!Jllng pledge of manpower and resources to
the buildup of NATO. Today, the actions of
the Western Europeans speak far louder than
words. The actions suggest that they have
long since abandoned earller common concepts o! NATO force goals, at least lnso!ar
as providing their share of manpower and
materiel may be Involved.
The French reaction In this respect has
been abrupt and to the point. Although still
adhering to the North Atlantic Treaty, France

withdrawn all divisions and other detachments from NATO. Moreover, President
de Gaulle has required the removal of NATO
headquarters from French territory. Great
Britain has decreased Its commitment or men
and resources to NATO and Is contemplating
a further cutback of Its army of the Rhine.
Indeed, all of the European NATO members,
to one extent or another, have lowered the
priority they attach to their mllltary consignments to the NATO command.
It can hardly be financial dlfficultles that
have caused the European all1es to veer
sharply from earl1er mill tary pledges; In an
economic sense Western Europe is far more
capable of meeting these pledges today than
when they were made. The retrenchment, Instead, appears to be grounded ln the conviction that the style ln which NATO was originally taUored ls no longer the mode for
Europe.
In these circumstances, It seems a paradox
that we-alone and apart from our Western
European all1es-have felt some compell1ng
need to maintain at full strength the pledged
deployment of forces In Western Europe. The
fears for the safety of that region against
Soviet aggression are obviously far greater
In the Executive Branch of the United States
government than they are In the European
chanceries.
This variance of view emphasizes the cataleptic nature of our pollcy on troop deployment ln Europe over the past few years. Of
late, there have been lndlcatlons of a relaxation In this rigidity. Even though the reductions In the deployment which are being discussed would appear wholly Inadequate, It
Is to be hoped that there Is at least a better
appreciation of the realltles of change In
Europe.
Early this year, I joined with 43 other
Senators In introducing a resolution which
recommends to the President that the Executive Branch make a substantial reduction
In the U.S. m1!1tary deployment ln Europe.
In my judgment, the actual size of the U.S.
establ1shment In Europe ought to bear some
relatlon.;hlp to what other NATO members
are prepared to do with regard to the common defense. On this basis, I have belleved
for some time that two or three U.S. divisions would be more In accord with current
realltles than the six which are stationed in
Europe. The lower figure would be no less
effective In emphasizing that we regard the
pledge of mutual defense of the North Atlantic Treaty as binding and that we hold
our national security as Inseparable from that
of Western Europe and the North Atlantic
region.
In all candor, I belleve there have been
strong tendencies to lnertl.a ln foreign policy,
under Democratic no less than Republlcan
admlnlstrattons. The NATO situation, as I
have just discussed It, 1s but one case In
point. A lag Is also reflected In pollcles toward Eastern Europe. Only In recent years
have these pollcies begun to take cognizance
of the changes in that region.
It Is true that President Eisenhower sought
in his admlnlstratlon to reverse some of the
excesses or cold war recrtmlnatlon. He tried
to restore at least some c1v111ty to the conduct of U.S.-Sovlet affairs, for example, by
his personal association with Mr. Khrushchev and other leaders of the Soviet Union.
It Is true, too, that during President Kennedy's administration, the Nuclear Test Ban
Treaty removed a rlgldlty which !or years
had decreed that no agreements, regardless
of how useful, should be concluded with the
Soviet Union. It 1s only been 1n the last year
or two, however, that as a nation we have
opened our eyes to the extent o! change In
Eastern Europe and have begun to explore
vigorously Its potentlalltles. We tend no
longer to react with an automatic "nyet"
when opportunities for understanding and
mutual advantage appear. Rather, there Is a
new sense or discernment which weighs ophas
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portunltles In terms of our national Interest
and lmpllcatlons for a more durable peace.
The fact Is that such opportunities have
been manifest for some time as a result not
only or changes In Eastern Europe but also
In the attitudes of that region towards Westem Europe. After World War II, the schism
In the continent was a severe one. It was
compounded of ancient rivalries, war-born
vendettas, ldeologlca.l parochialism, reciprocal fears and the Inner ab<;orptlon of human
energy In order to meet the great demands
of survl val and reconstruction which existed
In each war-shattered region.
After the death of Stalln, however, there
was a general loosening of straitjackets
throughout Eastern Europe. This development was manifested ln various ways and
notably In the growing response to consumer
needs on the part of the Communist governments. The satisfaction o! these needs, In
turn, Involved expanded commerce with the
non-Communist world and Western Europe
was quick to welcome lt.
The rise of trade levels between the two
regions ln the past decade has been very
pronounced. It should be noted, moreover,
that--Berlin Wall notwithstanding-West
Germany leads all other non-Communist
nations In commerce with the Soviet Union
and Eastern Europe. There has also been a
rapid growth of communications, travel,
cui tural exchange and other contacts between Eastern and Western Europe In the
last ff!W years. How far this process has gone
1s Indicated by a recent Yugosla vlan announcement that visas would no longer be
required of visitors !rom the West!
These !acts o! change In EUrope speak for
themselves. The talk of war subsidies; the
sounds of intra-European cooperation are
heard more clearly on all sides. In short, a
European detente has not only begun, It is
already well advanced.
Our reaction to change In Europe Includes
the lnltlal achievements of President Eisenhower and President Kennedy to which I
have already alluded, as well as the lnternatlonal bridge bu1ldlng upon which President
Johnson has embarked. What Is Involved
In the latter case Is a sustained effort In the
direction of restoring normalcy to our relations with the Soviet Union and other
Eastern European nations. At the same time,
the President Is seek.lng a significant reduction In the m1lltary-technologlcal rivalry
which, wittingly or unwlttlngly, could lead
the world Into a catastrophic conflict.
A number ot slgnlflcant agreements with
the Soviet Union are already associated ~th
this effort. They deal with cultural exchanges, consular questions, commercial aviation, and the peaceful use of outer space.
Negotiations have been Initiated to try to
11m1t the lncredlbly costly arms competition
of adding successive and reciprocal "antis"
to the balllstlc missile systems of each nation. Most recently, as I have noted, a Consular Treaty with the Soviet Union has been
ratified and just a few days ago by a vote or
88 to 0 the Senate consented to the ratification of a treaty on the peaceful use of outer
space.
Emotions run deep on any question of U.S.
relations with the Communist nations, especially In the llght of the bloody conflict In
Viet Nam. I am !rank to say that I have my
own reticences In this connection. The pursuit o! agreements with nations of Eastern
Europe seems incongruous with the war that
Is being waged against us wl th their help on
the other side of the globe. The best judgments we can obtain, however, tell us that
the rejection of the kinds of agreements
which have been made or are projected with
the Soviet Union and other Eastern European countries w!ll not make the sllghtest
difference In the mllltary situation ln Viet
Nam, that It wlll, In no way, dlmlnlsh our
casualties or hasten the conclusion of the
conflict.
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r
even now a r;r at ld I 1 I a rtr
,. hlch gna.,.,. at the Inner core of Chine
communism The epltheta and the accusations nnd the pro t-march
and th In·
fianunatory slogans t()JI us that poilU 1 In·
trospecUon In China Is Vf:l'}' deep e.nd wldeapre d at this moment.. Ita lmpact Ia being
felt partlcularls In the co
I clll
,.bleb
hlatorlcally hnve hou d strong W tern lnOucnce and In the provtnc~ along the Inner
hOrders which have long felt the pull of the
Hu tan prr..sence.
Ironically, the So\leL Union hna now
joined the United Stnt<"s u anathema In the
policies of the Peking government Tho origin or Sino-Soviet dlfficultl<'s can be trnced
historically to the Imperial projection which
carried Russian lnftuence unrlrr the Czars
across the Aslnn mainland lni<J AIMka and
M
fnr as California and Ha,.nll before It
began to retract. Over the ccnturl
there
h:we been Sino-SO\ lrt cia hes In tho hOrdcr
regions of Manchuria, Mongoll1 and Slnklnng Indeed, where\ rr there Ia 11 com·ergence ot the lnteresta or China and Hussln
across the expnnses or the tribal lands of
Crntral Asia, ancient antagonisms ha\e periodically been reactlvat.od In my judgment
the e historic antngonlsms have been n raetor S!'Cond not even to Ideological dlfl'crences
In contributing to the blttcrllc.ss and
estrangement In Chlnr e-So\ let relations
ovcr the P"-•t ""'eral years.
However serious the current dlfficultle.s,
we ought not to Indulge ourscl~·es with the
<'xpcctallon that t.hey will &<>lve our problema
In VIet Nam or A•la. Recent developments
ronrernlng the supply or mntt'rlcl to North
VIet Nam underscores this point In spite
of the blttt'r antngonlsm, the Soviet Union
and China have managed to work out an
agreement which lnsurr.s the transshipment
or Soviet supplies by wny or Chinn to Nortb
VIet Nnm . The prospect would appear to bP,
moreo\'er, tor a diminution rathrr Ulan an
Intensification of Sino-Soviet ant1p11 hl~s at
this time. Indeed, In the absence of basic
changes In the situation, the level or Int-erdependence between Russin. and Chinn Is
likely to continue to rl•e the longH the
Vlrtnamese conftlct perslsta.
In any event, we are restraIned by the
"wnlt nnd SPe" approach from mnklng adjustments of policy which would tnke cognl?.&nce or changes In the Sino-Soviet situation I might add that we hn\'e wnlt.<'d for
years, but It Is doubtful that we see our
wny nnr more clearly today with respect to
China than we did a ct~cade and a hlllf ago
China remnlns a pu7.zlement, compounded of
Ita Immense complexity and our profound
be"'1lderment. It Is not likely thn events
In Chln.'l. will ever fall. like Chinese cheekera, Into some simple pattern which will
make It easy for us to de\ elop n ne"' policy
v.1Lh respect to the Chine e mainland and Its
three-quarters of a billion people WhntE"ur
course we follow will lnvol<e n great measure or uncertalnlty and a high de.gree o!

11 the changes In Europe conaUtutc one
or the critical components or the altuauon
"'1th which United States foreign policy muat
cone m IL&el!, a aeoond Is to be round In
Aaln Along the II ttoral o! Ute Western PnciOc,
thcr looma th" unapoken but no l
proround confrontation with Chinn across the
tea of Korea, Japan, Taiwan nnd VIet
l'iam
In that region, we hn. e Jet to r ohe the
dlhmmu ot policy "hlch •orm posed by
the O<erthrov.• 0( the nnltonal gO\Ctllment
on the Cblne•e mainland almoet two decades
ago That cat.aclyamtc e•ent compelled the
complete recasting o! our r<'.latlona ,.1th
China In thr •race or a !ew postwar years,
the framework of our relations with tl>e Chln~e c ntml government altered from one or
grent Intimacy to one or grnat hostllttr 11><'
Hu lana replaced U8 In the role of !rlcnd
and mentor In the formulations or policy
which were undert.llken by the Peking People's RC'publlc.
C1111t In the role ot foreign de<ll by the
new lfO\~rnment In Peking, our policy towards the mainland became a non-policy
or n~esslty, we settled bnck to • walt a.nd
6CC" And through the admlulatrntlona of
three Pr ldenta, we have continued to look
for the happening which has not happened
We have yet to se-e clearly either a way to
put together the pieces or the policy which
collapf<C<I years ago or a way to begin afresh
In our relatione with the Chinese mainland
Contacts between ourselves and the Chi.
D«'ll<' mainland hnve dwindled almost to the
point of non-exlstt'nce. Americans do not go
there; mainland Chinese do not come to the
United Stat.es. At Intervals, Us. diplomats
have had slgnltlcant encount.crs with PekIng spokM'men on various Issues In 1050,
for example, we faced Chlneo!e Comrnunlst.a
at the United Nations, on the IRSues of the
K orean conftlct. WC' sat down "'1th the ChiIIC"<' again nt the Geneva Conferences of
1054 nnd 1962. on the Issues of Indo-Chlnn .
One channel or continuing diplomatic
oontact with the Peking government hns
been mnlntnlned for many years. It hns
conslstC'd or regular meetings, first In Geneva nnd then In Warsaw between the United
Stnte• nnd Chinese Ambassndors accredlt«'d
to Poland These conversntlon,_.brlef en.
count.<'ra, perhape, would be a bettt'r t.<'rmhave occurred with great regularity but not,
to my knowledge, with result.a o! any real
Import.
The absence of travel and diplomatic exchange between China and the Unltt'd States
hu been accompanied by a mutual nb tE"ntlon from other customary International relatlonsblpe, notably th06e of trade. The fact
Is that lUI a matter or omctal policy, we have
"'ant.<'d no part or trade with China Thnt Is
a policy which did not begin "'1th the new
bltterneaa generated by Vletnnm. It Is more
than a dec.nde old We are the only nation
In the world, so tar as I am aware, which
hu sought tor years to enforce not only "
prtmar • boycott on Chine e export.a but also
a •econdary boycott on re-exported Chinese
producta.
If the original seeds or h06 lllty were
ao.,.n, u noted, In Chinn's great revolu- rlllk
That Is true for our pre!: nt cour e or,
tlonan· upheB•al, they came to !rultlon In
the Kor an conntct In which thousands or more accuraiPly t!ie non-course Ha\e we
dared t.o nsk ourselves, lor exnmple, ,. he her
cnsunltl~ were Inflicted on en.ch slrle That
or not the tt'n or flrtoon ye:u-a In which
blood\· clat.h WIUI followed bv n near contllc
0\er .tbe Chinese Islands of Quemoy e.nd policy hns been In abeyance In regard to
.latau In the Taiwan Struts. !'ow, once the Chlne<;e mainland might bear some re·
aln In \'let Nam the unresohed hostility sponslblllty for Ute tragedy In v."hlcb we
v.ith China tbrea~na to brtng about an- are pres nur lnvolvoo In VIet !'IUD?
I.e me urn, hen to that trag dv to
oth~r blood)" mllltnr; eng
ement between
\1et !'am It ts the crltlcnl :ocus o: thl n ours lv~ and the Chinese.
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etTcct. an

op<"ll·f'nd~d

wnr whO!-n conclusion

was not ln ah•ht At that tlmn, the rornrnlt·
mrnt or U 8. fore~ hnct not yet rrnrhHI I 50.·
000 nnd Ole bornblng or the north "ns
sharply circumscribed A r~w days ago t h"
Commnnder of thr. UniH•d SU1tea tore~ In
VIet Nam, O•nernl W~_,;trnoreland, l<llcl
con,·entlon or the Assoctn.t~d Prf"..sa ••r do
not see nny end or the war In sight." In thr.
months brtwffn these two commt'nts. thrre:
hns be(;n the lrnnH•fUie Increase both In tho
US. manpower commitment nnd thr. Jnu I
of mllltnry \lolence The Viar, howevrr remains open-ended, thrrn Ia not tn al~>;ht any
mtlltnry ... ay to a conclusion ,..hlch br.nrs "
rational relation hlp to the original purpot;"
tor which the commitment "'as undf'r hn
It will be recalled that that purpolt' ,.1\1 to
help the people or South Vtr.t Nam prr rrvc
their fre~dom or polltlral choice and to assist th~m and all the p ple or Southeast
Asla to build a belt< r mntr.rlal litn tor
them elves
Howe..er It mny evenlllally be brought to
an end, It see-rna to me that thn war In
VIet Nam ls not .,;otn to be rf"SSl\·ed hy p~r
sonal criUctsm such u th:ll "'hlch from Ume
to time, has been almffi at the Pr !den
the VIce President, Amb
ndor Ooldb,rg an<l
othen Nor, may I say, "'Ill I b resohed by
he 'lfllng o! the cora rucUve debet• o!
dlf!~:"renccs In or out or the Senate Differences o! viewpoint, responalbly nrrlved at
nnd responsibly eJ~pr ed In my judgment
are """"nttal to n solu ton In VIet Nnm rtntrnlned and th u ·httul d b e ot policy 1s
not a luxury I Ia n n
ty
Iruwfar lUI Pr !dent J ohnson Ia con rrned,
he 1s op<'n t o any au • Ions "'hlch may
cmergn from dlacu I n nnd d bate nnd which
may hold some prom e or pea~ 11 kna...,.
as do ...-e thnt the crucial qu Uon ts not how
thta war began but ho"'' thla war can t •
ended at th" rll t
lble m mcnt and tn
an honorable manner An honorable ndlng
1s not olng to be brought about by urnpi
c r rmulaa sUCh na get all the "'ay tn•
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or "get all the way out." An honorable endIng Is not going to be brought about by the
spread of m111tary violence, "'1th Its attendant tragedy !or all VIetnamese. north and
south, for ourselves. and !or all concerned.
President Johnson's concern with this
tragedy Is as deep as yours or mine-deeper
perhaps because he has to llve with It twentyfour hours a day. The ultimate responslblll ty In his and, for him, there Is no surcease.
Insofar as the Senate Is concerned, there
nrc many viewpoints on VIet Nam, but there
Is unanimity on the deslrab!llty o! a prompt
ending or this war In an honorable peace.
Indeed, a !ew weeks ago by a vote of 89 to 2
the Senate endorsed a continued search by
the President and others for a negotiated
settlemcn t of the conlllct.
As for myself, I have expressed the view
many times that the only practicable course
Is one which seeks to contain a further
spread or the conlllct In Asia, one which
seeks to limit our involvement In the confilet while the effort to achieve an honorable
settlement Is Intensified. The !allures so far
to find the formula which might tend to lead
to negotiations, In no sense, dl vests us o! the
obllgtlon to ourselves, to the VIetnamese
people and to the world to continue the
search.
To that end, many suggestions have been
made. Over the past year or so, for example,
I have publicly proposed the following·
I. Military emphasis should be placed on
scaling of! or t!:le northern border of South
VIet Nam at the 17th parallel by the construction o! a line of defense which could be
maintained largely by South Vietnamese
forces as an alternative to the continued
bombing of the north.
2. The reconvening of the Gene> a Conference on the basis of the 1954 and 1962 agreements, by call of the co-chairmen, the United
Kingdom and the Soviet Union or by any
other participants;
3 . The holdlng In Rangoon or Tokyo or In
any other suitable place of an all-Asian conference to consider the conditions o! an honorable peace In VIet Nam;
4 . The Inclusion ln a peace conference on
Viet Nam o! any and all governments or
groups whose concurrence may be necessary
to bring about an end to the conflict;
5. The broadening of the M.mlla Conference of 1966 to Include China and other nonparticipating nations In Asla;
6. The arrangement o! a face-to-face meetIng of Secretary of State Dean Rusk and the
Foreign Minister o! the Peking government
to discuss the restoration o! peace In Viet
Nam.
rn ad<lltlon, I have suggested that our pollcymakers examine with great care, the views
expressed by the French government, as well
as by the Cambodian leader, Prince Norodom
S!hanouk. I have urged that the proposals
o! U Thant and Mrs. Gandhi receive consideration. I have endorsed various statements of the President, Secretary Rusk, and
Ambassador Goldberg, all o! which have
made clear that not only our proposals but
also those o! Hanoi and the People's Liberation Front might provide a basis for settlement. I have recommended that there be not
just a cessation of the bombing of North
VIetNam but a general cease-fire and standfast, with a halt on both sides. to maneuvers
on the ground In the S~3. and In the air, to
the end that e!Torts might be made to Initiate talks.
Many others In the Senate and elsewhere
have o!Tered suggestion~. There has been
no lack of proposals . Many have been pursued through the channels of tradl tiona!
diplomacy. The distinguished SecretaryGeneral of the United Nations, U Thant, has
been a central figure In these secret dtplomatlc efforts to bring about peace. In spite
of his great efforts and those of other diplomats and men of good w!ll, peace ls no
closer.
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This factor has led me to question an
apparent reluctance to bring Into play the
more formal machinery of the Charter of
the United Nations In an effort to break
down the barriers to peace. I question this
reluctance again today. The fact Is that the
U. N., to date, has not even taken official
cognizance of the existence of a conflict
In Viet Nam. That sort of ostrich-approach
seems to me to court for the organization
Irrelevancy a~ best and eventual disaster at
worst.
I do not believe anyone has a right to
expect, with respect to Viet Nam, a miracle
o! peace from the U. N. I do believe, however,
that the peoples of the world have a right
to expect some public Indication of concern of member nations, as to the dangers
of this conflagration. There Is a right to expect, at least, some e!Tort to use the machinery of the Charter to dampen down
the flames in Viet Nam before the war
goes entirely out of control.
There are, of course, great difficulties Involved In the assumption o! an active role
by the U.N. with respect to Viet Nam. Two
of the principal parties concerned-North
VIet Nam and Oomrnunlst China--for example, are not members o! the United Nations. That does not foN!close, however, a
contribution from the U.N. It has seemed to
me entirely appropriate that at the very
least, the U.N. should open Its forum to discussion of the problem by all Involved directly or Indirectly In Viet Nam-members
and nonmembers alike. Such a procedure Is
proper; lt is precedented; It Is not subject to
veto. There Is no reason, so far as I can see,
why the security Council cannot offer to
bring together not only the member states
who are most Intimately concerned In the
situation-that Is, the United States and the
Soviet Union-but also the non-members,
that Is, Oommunist China, North Viet Nam,
the government of South Viet Nam and any
other group of relevance to a peaceful settlement. I should think, too, that the Security
Council might also consider requesting the
International Court of Justice to render an
advisory opinion on the Geneva Accords of
1954 and 1962. All of the bell1gerents have
made reference, from time to time, to these
Accords as the basis for a peaceful settlement. Certainly, It Is appropriate to try to
see through the Impartial and judlclow; eyes
of the Oourt what the appl!cablll ty of these
agreements may ental! In present circumstances.
Let me make clear that I suggest the pursuit of pea.oe through the U.N. Security
Council not In lieu of prl va te or secret
diplomacy, not In lieu of a revival o! the
Geneva Conference. Rather, I suggest It as
a supplement or precipitant of these approaches or any other which may hold some
promise o! a solution.
As I have noted, the effort has been made
since the outset to find a pathway to peace
through secret and traditional diplomacy
and It has been unsuccoosful. Therefore, I
think there Is everything to be gained and
nothing to be 106t at this time by a public
search before the U.N. !or the gaps between
the posl tiona of the bell1geren ts and the
means by which they may be bridged .
There Is no assurance that a resort to the
procedural machinery of the United Nations
will produce any more significant results
than those yielded by secret and tra.d! tiona!
diplomacy. That will not be known, however,
unless and until the approach Is tried.
Insofar as this nation ls concerned, I cannot see that we violate our own Interests or
the Interests of any other nation by a vigorous pursuit of peace at the U.N. Ba.•ed on
the Korean precedents, our government can
very properly urge upon the Security Oouncll a vote on these two spec!flc resol u tiona
pertaining to VIetNam:
One, that the secretary General be instructed to Invite governments and groups
directly and Indirectly Involved In the VIet-

namese confllct, Including China and North
VIet Nam, to participate before the Council
In an open and unlimited <llscusslon o! the
conflict;
Two, that the security Oouncll request the
International Court of Justice to render an
advisory opinion on the current appllcabU!ty
of the Geneva Accords o! 1954 and 1962 and
the obligations which these agreements may
place on th06e directly or Indirectly Involved
In the Vietnamese contl!ct.
In closing, may I emphasize that the responsibility for the conduct of our nation's
foreign affairs Is vested In the President of
the United States. Whether we agree with
him or <llsagree, whether he pleases or displeases us, will not lighten one Iota the onerous burdens which rest on his shoulders as
a result of the VIetnamese confllct. The PresIdent may look !or advice to his aides In the
Executive Branch. He may look to the Senate and to the people o! this nation. Whether
or not advice Is forthcoming, whether or not
there Is consent to his course, the President
still must decide what he believes to be In
the best Interests of the Unl ted States. That
is his responslbU!ty. He cannot share It-he can only assume It, on behalf o! all o! us.
The President needs and should have our
understanding, our help and prayers, and
the support which can be given to him ln
good conscience. It ought to be borne In
mind at all times that whatever contribution this nation can make to a peaceful settlement In VIet Nam, that contribution can
only be made and w!ll be made on behalf o!
all of us, In the end, by the Preslden t o! the
United States
EXHWIT 4
FACE THE

NATION

(As broadcast over the CBS Television Net-

work and the CBS Radio Network, May 7,
1967)
Guest: The Honorable Arthur J. Goldberg,
U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations.
News Oorrespondents: Martin Agronsky,
CBS News; Anne We!ll-Tuckerman, agence
France-Presse; Richard c . Hottelet, CBS
News.
Director: Robert VI tarelll.
Producers: Ellen Wadley and Prentiss
Childs.
(NoTE.-Transcrlpts of this broadcast wlll
be distributed In New York wheN! the program originates and In Washington.)
Mr. AGRONSKY. Mr. Ambassador, a former
highly-placed advisor In both the Kennedy
and Johnson Administrations, Mr. Richard
Goodwin said last night the United States
has abandoned the policy of seeking a peaceful solution In VIetnam, and looks now !or
a milltary solution, which calls for an uncpndltlonal surrender. What Is your answer
to that, sir?
Ambassador GOLDBERG. Well, Martin, I do
not agree with that statement, and I do not
think It Is well founded, although I understand and appreciate the motl"CS of Mr.
Goodwin, a very nice person, In raising the
question. And, It Is Important that we Jay
that to rest. The United States position with
respect to a solution In VIetnam remains
what It has been consistently since the
President's speech at Johns Hopkins In April,
1965. We seek a political solution, not a military solution to this conflict. By the same
token we reject the notion that North VIetnam nnd Its allies should have the right
to Impose a military solution on the situation. We do not seek the unconditional surrender of our adversarlee and that, I repeat,
Is a constant policy, It hM not changed, It remains the dominating Impulse of the United
States In this sl tuation.
ANNOuNCER . From CBS New York, In color,
Face the Nation, a spontaneous and unrehearsed news Interview with United States
Ambassador to the United Nations Arthur
Goldberg. Ambassador Goldberg will be questioned by CBS News United Nations Corre-
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hmb
dor GoLoanc Well, M rtln, I
think that diplomatic errorta cannot atwaya
be public I wlll aay t.O you, and I will a&y t.0
the American people, that our diplomatic
e!forta are unremlttlnr and are pur ued with
the aame vigor that the war Ia being purau d . We are In a great conl!lct We cannot
terminate the conl!.lct by ouraelvea Any conntct requtrea agreement on both part& t.0
terminate the con!Uct. But, we aeelt a peaceful aolutlon, not ~ace at any price but an
hOnorable solution through diplomatic resource• and every day at the UN !La my colle~guea here and at the UN know, Mr
Hottelet, Mlq Tuckerman, we pursue this,
we make proi>M. t do not recall a single day
In he two years alm<>&t that I have been at
the UN where we have not had conversatlon.a
on that aubject Those conversations &till
continue here at UN New York and I thlnlt
they continue In many capital& In thP world
where we have representation, and our ad·
versarlf'a have repre!~nta ton
Mlaa W~trLL·TucKD><AN Mr. hmba&aador,
I understand that you are planning t.0 go t.O
Geneva during the Pacem In Terris Conference at the end o! thta month . U Thant, the
S~retary-General ot the UN, will be ~here
and alao, I believe, the repreaent.'ltlvea or
H~nol t.nd maybe the FLN, the VIet Cong
Now, ta tha~ ao, do you have such a plan, t.nd
tt you do, do you Intend to seck contact with
~;he Hanoi and FLN people?
AmbM&ador GOLDBltRC . Well , Anne, part or
the dtmculty here Ia that lt you aay aometblng
like thla you raise !alae hopes. When I anld
we pursue the path or peaceful settlement, I
would not want to create anr false Impression that a settlement Is In the omng I have
been Invited t.O go t.O Gene\ a . t have said, aa
I have aald to many groups In this country
and aw y !rom this country, thnt I &hall be
\Cry glad t.0 go and state our poaltlon , It It
Is at a.ll poaalble, consistent with the work
we have to do In New York You know we have
some unnntahed business In New York, we
are not nnlahed with thla special sesalon I
am no~ awnre that our adversaries have
agreed to be there, and I would not Uke t.O
ere te the Impression that something fresh
ta In the works. I shall , I hope, be there I
have some other bustneaa In Europe. I shall
state the position or the United States, but
the Important thing Is thl&-we are n CJt IncitIng tn potnta or contact, It there Is a mutual
wllllngnesa to conduct a dial ogue which I
rtg rd t.0 be tndlapen~able t.O ~ttle this conftlct No conntct can be settled , whether It Ia
domeatlc, aa I know rrom my ell])ertence, or
International without a dialogue, "'lthout a
di.acua&lon, without a willingness on both
p rLI t.O exchange point& or vtew
Mr HoTT&LET. Mr Arnbluisador , there Is a
dialogue In the United States right n ow o>er
the me ulng or thla v.ar, Ita nature and Ita
~nd and It haa been 118.ld that the dluent
v.hlch haa been voiced sometlme.s •ul lo udly
and forcefully, Ia a complicating factor
v.hlch put& oii an end an hono rabl end t.0
t le
r Do )OU reel that aome limit& o r re' n s lblUty, aa •cme pecJl' advocate &hould
1.. t • t to thla dlMenl?
Thla Is Dick an old
My own reeling Ia
\Cn' ample I atat~ It aa a Juauc
or the
Su, 1 m Court 1 ha-e n c.t chan ed my mind
use I took otr the ro be Dl.aac!nt Ia all 1m·
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wu the unconc11U &1 •
0
y and Japa.n
t .. not
n
e wtth the ata
r Ulta oonlU t Qutte U
contrary AI
n made t.nd I upr
a
VIew, that di.IMnt ~man be rNPOnalbJe..• r1!!ll
er, 1 ata~ In pi.Un r
th•
Obvtouaty, all or ua
uld lilt~ dtaaent t.0 bt Ckne.-&1
bl y wbn are th lfO&l- ot Ute
and they r~ •hat the
...,.ponalble but who 1.1 t.0 d l!n "r pon· United Sta
atble?" It Ia out or the exellan e or .-lewa that Preal.den aald a BaiU ore, and they are
we can a.rrtve at a right declaton The Gov- atlll the go&Ia We do not
It uncondiUonal
ernment. and t apeak ror the ao... emment at aurrendar or N rth \.,ewu.m We do n
~It
the UN, believes that It hu made the right that they ahould chan e their •> • m We
IuUon ot t.ht oondeclalona, but a democracr ntalla the right are r&lll!y 1.0 negottata a
a policy ot
or anybOdy t.0 dSsaent. whether It 1.1 r pon- ntct We do not elt to tm
atble or no Now, hat doea net m an that non-•H nno.e::.t.-ef al!anmrnt on 1J1e GO\"•
any cl l:1."n haa a right to enga
In Illegal ernment ot South Vlet.nam We are r dy that
activity That 1.1 a dltrerent matter What Ia the:; ahould be nonaligned , l! that ta l.helr
oont..rnrr t.O law Ia not the type or dlaaent desire Our objective ta a almple one We
cit ror them the people eor the Sou h , the
contemplated by the First Amendment The
First hmendment contemplate& tree dbcw- right t.0 determine their o.,.·n d•Uny, tr.e
aton It Ia only by tree dtacuMIOo we can ar- rrom forte and rree from
rcton
:1ve at correct declalona, and r don t think
Now, those are conttnulnr oala. The1 art
that ta a algn or wea.ltneaa, I think It Ia a algn far dltTerent !rom a ayatem where you aay
ot strength and It Ia really what we are fight· the way t.O acttle thla war ta !or you t.0
lng about In VIetnam , that the people should ma.rcll up and surrender t.O th American
have a right t.O expreaa themaelvea, and a P'orces 1 aee a great dltrerence In that But
right t.0 arrive at their own declalona, free we cannot aettle the war by oul'lt'lvea Two
from Coree. free trom violence, by the cru lble p:trttes must aettle the war.
Mr ACRON11KT, Mr hmbaaaador, there Ia
or tree dlacusa.lon.
Mr. AGRONSKY. Mr. Ambaaaador- gre t concern In the country, and throughMr. Harrnrr. Congreaamen H~b~rt. ot out the world at the Inability o! thla Ad·
Loulalana on Friday auggeat~ that the Firat mtnlatratton t.0 settle the war, and Senat.Or
hmendment be eet aside, you wouldn't agree? Aiken , ot Vermont, a.!ter the laauance of
Amba&aadot GOLDBE&G, No, I don't f4P'I<I that White Paper by the Senata Republican
wl th that. I am not aware or that statement Polley Committee, aatd he didn't feel thla
and I don't like t.O quarrel with Congreaa- Administration could settle the war, that It
men, It's not diplomatic Cor me t.O do so. would take a Republican Admtntatratton
But, the Supreme Court of the United
t don't think Aiken waa really apeaktna
States, talk.lng about the Civil War alld at only to political tenna. He really teela that
a time o! OW' greatest travail, aald In ll:x this Administration hu arrived at a point
Parte Milliken, and It waa dlrec~ at Abra· ot Impotence In trying t.O aettle thla war.
ham Lincoln, our great President, "The Con· Would yo u agree: or courae you won' ?
atltutlon or the United State& holda under
Am~ador GOLDBDO. Well, !!rat O! all, I
the mantle or tt.. protection all cttt.:.ena In ought t.0 con!esa aome prejudtcaa In the
time or war a.s well a.s In time or peace It matter. I am a great admlrer O! Senat.Or
Ia not written t.0 be relinquish~ becau e we
Aiken I regard him to be one or !.he very
are In a war and In a ~rlod ot grave con- great Senat.Ora In the United State& Senate.
filet." I believe profoundly In that.
Secondly, when I took my aeat on the Su?-.1r. AoaoNSKT. You would not under any
preme Court, I got out or polltlca and, dectrcurn11tances then equate dlaaent with a aptte what you may read about In the preaa
Io.ck ot patriotism?
and so on r am not going t.O re-enter the
Ambaaaador GoLDBERC, Oh, no. That Ia a
neld or pollttca.
danger we muat obviously avoid We went
Thirdly, I regard thla sx-t or mine to be
through a grueling experience during the completely t.0 be non-political. I a~ak ror
McCarthy period . I would regard It t.0 be a all ot the American people. t apeak tor the
horrendous day tor our country If, because Government, but I a~ak !or a!! or !.he
or the grave conltlct we are In, that there hmerlcan people.
should be any resurrection of McCarthyl.sm
So that I do not enter. and would not
In this country. Dissent Ia not t.0 be equated
"'lth disloyalty There are many people who enter, tnt.O thla queatlon or Republican or
Democratic
poelttona. I don't thlnlt Senat.Or
&tncerely question our motives and pollcl.,..
Now. then. we can defend them Govern- Aiken speaks politically, I huten t.O add .
Now, every Admlnl~tratlon , Republican or
ment 11M the right or free •peech, t.0o Thla
program Is an Illustration or l.hls. I don't Democratic, repreBenttng the American people,
will have t.0 try t.O nnd an honorable
lind any dl!llculty In having tnvltatlona to
present the Government point or vtew. the solution to thla war.
I believe that all or our people, and everyAdministration point ot view t.O the AmerIcan people. My dlmculty Is getting too mnny body In all or our polltlcal parties, regardleaa
Invitations. So the Government. we must ot their approach t.O the problem. want an
recognize that government does have the h o norllble settlement, and the queatton Ia :
right or tree speech ju! t a.s a c itizen does, how do you nnd It?
but that ta part or the American schem~
I think our ad,erurtes are pretty reallattc
Ml.sa WoLL·TucKEilMAN Mr Amh aaad or
I think that they know that the American
r ou
peo ple wlll suppert their Government In the
Mr. Acmo. KT. Go ah d Ml
Tucker - attempt 1.0 nnd a n honorkble aolutlon to the
man
r, and tr they canno t lind an honorable
MISS WULL· TUCK£RNAN YOU b a \e aa.ld aolutlon will auppert their Oo'ernment In
earlier hat the Unit~ Statea d ocs not aeel< the pursUit C f the Wilt, and therefo re thla
uncondttlon 1 aurrender cr the adv rs ary
G overnment, this Admlnlatratlon, muat try
Yet, AmeriC&D omct ls say conatantl y that to nnd a solution and It hu the aame pro bthe U
Will continue nghtlng unUI t.he ag· lem thnt an y admlnhtratlon will nnd, the
gr ton 1.s stopp~ Then they &af v.e wv.nt o her aide muat Join It In Ita objective, and
t.O nego tiate Well what Ia here t.0 nego tiate Ulat h.U been p rt or the dtl!iculty, We canabout, I! thta Ia the poatuon or he U n ited not get a dialogue cotn~r . m ny attempLI h&tt
States?
h n made to try and get a dialogue iOIOII
Ambllo64ador Got.oana Well, An n e there that wlll brlr. about a concrete dbcu tonhen.·
Is this wa.r t.0 be bruugh t t.O an honcrta a 11reat deal t.0 negotiate about
n t o t all
the war hu t.O continue until there Ia a ablo end ? T h us rar "'e haven t b~n aucceuacttlemen t or the war, and the ract t ha t the tul but we hue t.0 ~r uere.
r g
on d
not ~ n tha t the
I
Mr Ho1TU..rr Mr Ambaaaador, I would lllr.P
rl!er point In your
o r the war Ia unconcUUo nal surrend er There t.O harken b ck 1.0 an
han been wara when t.h t hu been the ool
career Yo u know u much about labor rela·
In Wor d Wu U , the d tl.n~ oal
Ule t na aa anyone In th Un i ted Sta ea
not~
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There Is a great deal of controversy, too,
and a great clash of Interest between labor
and management, In which the Government
Is having to Intrude more than it has ever
done.
Do you think that, looking over the field
with the collapse of a newspaper In New
York, largely because of union pressure; with
the automobile Industry facing Vf!rY serious
contractual negotiations with the mattf!r of
the rallroad strike; do you think that the
tlme ls right for a whole new look at the Institution of collective bargaining:
Ambassador GoLDBERG. Well, Dick. I am an
ex-expert in the subject, If I ever was an
expert. I constantly must seek new looks, but
I doubt very much whether there are any
magic solutions about major conflicts, just
as I doubt that whether by the wave of a
wand, which we would all like to find, a
magic wand, we can get this contllct In VIetnam over.
In our domestic area we have a great problem. We would like labor confilcts to subside.
We would like them to be all solved, but
would also like to preserve our freedom Now,
all of the solutions to the grave labor confilets Involve trying to find a way to solve
the problems and maintain freedom. This Is
not easy to do, whether It Is newspapers In
New York; whether It Is the railroads, so I
suggest tha.t we don't do badly In our domestic scene, by and large, we get together settle
oon!llct, as you know, since you are also Involved recently, that was settled. We had
some problems on the television Industry . I
think that the railroad conflict wtll l:ie settled. I believe It ought to be.
I wish, I wtsh In the ln ternatlonal scene
that we were as successful M we are In the
domestic scene, when we have a grave
con!llct.
It Is much-! can testify by personal experience now, In two years, lit Is much more
dlmcult to settle basic contllcts Internationally than domestically for a very simple
reason--<iomestlcally, whatever our differences, we all serve the same goals and believe
In them; Internationally, we have wide
divergencies o! goals, objectives, methods,
and that presents us with a great problem.
Mr. AGRONSKY. Mr. Ambassador, let's return
you to the area of your oompetence ln the
United Nations. Why don't we use the UN
to seek peace In VIetnam?
Ambassador GoLDBERG. Well, Martin, we
have tried; I believe, and one of the reasons
I accepted my present post, Is I believe
strongly that the UN. after all, we are the
principal architects of the UN, Franklin
Roosevelt and Winston Churchill were the
architects, I believe the UN must play a role
In preserving peace and security In the M>rld.
Mr. AGRONSKY. Why don't we use It for
that purpose?
Ambassador GOLDBERG. Now, we have tried.
we brought the-the first efl'ort I made
when I carne down here was to try to Involve
the UN In finding a way to a peaceful settlement. As a matter of fact, It has been forgotten In all of the historical recitations.
Quite early after I came down, In August of
1965, I brought a letter from the President
encouraging the Secretary Gen!!ral to renew
his activity ln this area. He had made prior
efforts that were unsuccessful, I don't want
to go Into the details of that. It has never
been published, but I would !Ike to report
that In August, 1965, an efl'ort was made by
the Secretary General, we were cooperative,
the adversaries were not.
Now, after that, we brought the matter
officially to the UN In late January, 1966, and
we met opposition to that. We met It by the
Soviet Union, we met It by France, and we
had a debate, we Inscribed It on the agenda,
we could not pursue It because Implicit was a.
veto threat that If we dld, the effort of the
UN would be vetoed.
Just the other day, I said at the General
A.o;..,embly that 1! the Soviet Union would

withdraw Its objection, we could go to the
Security CouncU tomorrow and take up what
the UN might do to bring about peace.
Mr. AGaONSKY. Old you say that to the Soviet representative?
Ambassador GOLDBERG Yes, I did.
Mr. AGRONSKY. Well. what did he say?
Ambassador GOLDB!:RG. Well, he a.ald the UN
hasn't got competence to deal with this subject. I don't agree with him.
Miss WEILL-TuCKERMAN. Mr. Ambassador,
when you brought the question to the Security Oouncll In January, '66, the same day.
simultaneously came the announcement of
the resumption of the bombing. This, of
course, created a certain type of Impression
that maybe was not too favorable tor a
dispute.
In the same way you have, I believe, recently, you, yourself accepted the latest plan
of the Secretary General U Thant which calls
for a cease-fire, stand-still truce, and General
Westmoreland a few weeks later said that a
cease-fire was not In the Interest of the
United States. Now, how do you resolve these
contradictions and the credibility gap that
has developed at the UN and anywhere else?
Ambassador GOLDBERG. Well, Anne, you
have asked about ft ve q uestlons so I will
try to answer them In sequence. First, when
we carne In January, 1966, that was not my
first effort to bring lt to the UN. I was perfectly willing, on behalf of the United States.
to bring It In August. 1965, when that situation dld not exist. I was quite ready to
bring It during the bombing pause of December-January, December, 1965, January, 1966.
Why did I not do so at that time?
Because everybody that I consulted down
here said-now, this Is not a good tlme to
bring It to the UN because there Is underway a diplomatic effort. This might Interfere
with the effort. I consulted very broadly, and
finally, when we brought It at the tlme we
did, we had exhausted the posslblllty of arriving at a diplomatic solution during the
bombing pause. and I recommended to the
President, let us bring It, because It seems
to me that everybody says, no good tlme
exists for bringing lt. Now, about a cease-fire
and the Secretary General's suggestion. The
official response of the United States, the
official-now, we are not going to-we talk
about free speech, we are not going to prevent officials of the American Government,
we are not a monolithic government, and
If the President stopped General Westmoreland from expressing his sincere convictions,
there would be a. great outcry In the press
and on television that we are gagging the
General The official position of the United
States was given ln an official letter which
I wrote and delivered to the Secretary General, with the approval o! the Government
at the highest levels, In which we said:
1. You propose a cease-fire, we are agreeable. All we suggest, and I think quite rightly,
Is that we have some conversations because
a cease-fire must be an effective cease-fire,
not that that means that every little bit of
shooting wlll stop, but you have to arrange
when will It take effect; how wtll armies disengage. We have practical things to do.
Second, so that remains the position We
are for a. mutual cease-fire, and we are
ready today to talk about the modal! ties of
such a cease-fire. That Is the position of the
United States Government.
Now, there are difficulties, as General
Westmoreland, he Is a soldier, properly
pointed out. But the official position of
the United States Government Is, we are !or
a cease-firf'
Mr . AGRONSKY. How do you explain therefusal of the Soviet Union to permit the discussion of the VIetnam problem In the
United Nations?
Ambassador Gor.onrnc . Well, that Is a very
troublesome thing. I wish the Soviet Union
would join the United States In putting Its
full force behind working out an honorable
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solution to VIetnam. I think It Is In their
Interest. I think It Is In our Interest. We
are the two largest world powers. The greater
the power, the greater the responsibility to
trv to work out world peace and worlcl
S<·curity
Now. how do you explain their attitude'
They say they want a peace, we say we want
peace; they say they want the Geneva Accords Implemented, we say we want the
Geneva Accords Implemented. Then we fall
npart.

We fall apart because we say anybody, you,
should do something about lt. You are a coChairman of the Geneva Conference, If you
don't agree that the UN Is the place, join
Prime Minister Wilson. reconvene the Conference, we will be there. We are ready to
do It, we are ready to say that we ought to
reaffirm the Geneva Accords.
Mr. AGRONSKY. How do they answer that'
Ambassador GoLDBERG. I think their answer
is this, and it Is not a satisfactory answer by
our likes. They say that we support the program of Hanoi In this matter. Hanoi has
said we do not recognize the competence of
the UN, we do not believe It Is necessary to go
to Geneva. All that Is necessary to do Is for
the Americans to get out and there will be
peace In that part of the world.
Now, that Is not so.
Mr. AGRONSKY. Why dO we keep saying to
ourselves and Indicating, as you do. and as
all American officials do. that the Russians
want peace In VIetnam? Yet, the Russians
have continually stated that they will supply
Hanoi with all of the help that they possibly
can.
There Is a fundamental contradiction here.
How do you explain that?
Ambassador GoLDBERG Martin. there Is
a contradiction and we cannot resolve that
contradiction. And. I do not say that we
support what they do, quite the contrary.
I would hope that the Soviets would resolve
this contradiction In their own policy because I don't believe that that policy Is conductive to peace. I would hope that they
would really come to terrns and use their
Influence as they dld In Laos In 1962, to
bring about a resolution of that particular
problem that I know about. because I was
In President Kennedy's Cabinet, which was
not satisfactorily resolved because lt has
not been honored by the Pathet Lao and the
Communists, but at least we brought about
a solution.
I would hope they would do the same.
On the other hand, because we cannot
persuade them to do the same, that does not
mean we should not try In other areas to try
to bring about an accommodation of point
of views.
As a matter of fact, every time we bring
about an accommodation of point of views
In other areas, space, counsular treaty, nuclear nonprollfieratlon, we Illustrate the Inconsistency of their policy because here we
are pursuing the paths of getting along. tryIng to minimize the area of conflict and we
have an area where the conflict exists. We
think they are Inconsistent not the United
States-Mr HOTrELET. But this approach toward
agreement seems to have ground to a stop
now, because the negotiations on the an tlballlstlc missiles system, the negotiations on
the Treaty to ~an the Spread of Nuclear
Weapons seem to be at least In trouble, 1f
not broken down altogether
Ambassadar GOLDBERG. No, Dick, I don't
quite agree with that. It Is not easy to find
accommodation, as I discovered when I was
In charge of our team that negotiated the
Space Treaty
On the other hand, we made some significant steps this year. We have the air agreement, and while we have some technical
problems, I think we will resolve them. We
did agree upon the Space Treaty. We did
agree upon the Consular Treaty.
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·ow. we hav raufted Ulem, by tlle y,
and 1 am YUJ proud or our OOI.Ultry, that we
•ere among the ftrat.. Naw we upect and
an dpate Ul&~ Ule ~let Union will ratify
tbem
It 1a now up to Ulem
l'\ow, on nu 1 r proll!eratlon. ~e ar ID
n"ruaaUona and we have some problems
•11.h our own alllea, we are ll")1ng to r....alve
them 1 notice Mr Poo;ter hall gone to 1okyo
It Ia natural that we should ha\'e to explain
and make aure that all points or view are
presentoo, ao I don t agrre that th~y have
come to an end.
lr. AGROI< KT, Well, we have run out of
ttme, unfortunately, Mr. AmbasSador. I wish
)OU could have concluded by l~JIIng u.s of a
new spec~nc peace bid In which you nre
operatlu , but apparently, &.II you aay, Its
alwaya going on. Thank )OU Vel")' much for
bt'lng here to Face the Nation
Ambaasndor OoLDBEkC Thank you, l\larUn
ANI<OUNCI'Jl Today, on Face the Nation,
Unl~ States Amba.au.dor to t.he United Natlona Arthur Goldberg wa.s lnt.en·lewed by
DS r>ewa United Natlona Corr pond~nt
Richard C. Hottelet, Anne Weiii-Tuckennan
or Agence France-Presse. CDS News Correspondent MA.rtln Agronsky led the questionIng Next week, another prominent figure In
the news will Face the Nation .
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, will
the Senator yield?
Mr. MANSFIELD. I yield.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I
join with the distinguished maJOrity
leader, the senior Senator from Montana ,
in his recommendation.
I agree with him that the hour Is
growing late. During thc~c last 2 or 3
weeks, particularly since General Westmoreland was here, I feel that there has
been an Increase In tension not only In
this country, but also between this country and Russia. We have noted the Incidents that occurred in the Sea of Japan .
They do not seem to be so important In
and of themselves. However, I think they
arc symptomatic of a ncrvous1.ess which
could lead to world war III.
I think the mention In the nc\\<papers
recently of the Prt>sidcnt's own thought
almost a year ago about the possibility of
this war leading to world war III Is very
om.lnous. I think that the .situation ccrta.l.nly warrants the recommendation
that has been made by the Senator from
Montana.
I join with him in that reccmmendatlon. I also take this opportunity to pay
my respects to the Senator from Oregon
who, I believe, was the first Member of
the Senate, that I can recall, who so
stronclv recommended early In the conflict that It be taken to the United
Nations.
I think It is quite correct thnt we recognize his forcs!~tht m that connection.
I wish I could think of something that
could give 1mpetus to this idea.
I am afraid I do not sec much Inclination on the part of the E.xecutlvc to move
111 this direction, however. There seems
to ha\ e den· loped a feeling that notlung
can be done either m or out of the Uni ed
Nations and that we are now followmg
an all-out military cour e.
I hope that feeling Is not so and that
th r ommendatlons of the Senator
from • tontana wUJ be taken rlously.
I con ratulatc him for h s \'cry etrec\ statement.
lr
lANSFIELD Mr. Pr !d nt, I
thank U1c Senator. I hope that his fore-
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bod1n 1s not correct, beca
the Ume
And 1t t.h
ri tJ
1s etUng pretty &hart
• · Uona do unI hope that v. v.ill refer this matter
rc
In the orld.
to the U •.. an organiza.Uon v.hlch, 1n v.hich
th orl.gin I purpo
or lh
my opinion, has no met Its rcsponslbll- on;nnlzaUon-t.o mntntain pe ce In th
lty from the very beginning of this con- v.orld
nd U1 •t come forT rd v. !Ul a
flict, and that 1f the Unll.<'d Nations docs solution, eH n thou hIlls not 100 pcrcem
face up to lh1s matter and a call is I ('(! v. hat t.h United Stat
wan , I hope
to the VIetcong, the North VIetnam e, that the Pr I dent wIll
tlt ton~ pt It
the Chln~P. and others to come to the
It is high lm no t.h t we find ou
conference table, that we v. !II be prcpart'd v.ho really Is promoUn thl v. r In
to accept the \erdict of the Unll.<'d Na- Southeast Asia and v.ho really wan to
tions 1n that instance, \\hatc\cr It mny maintain pc cc ln the v.orld
be.
I bel!e\·e that other countrl<' b d
Mr. President, I yield to the dlstin- the United Sta
will br. In a pos!t.!on
~lshcd Senator from Vermont.
w hc1 e the rc p n lblllty v. ill rest upon
Mr. AIKEN. Mr. Pr 1dcnt, \\e hav
thr!r shoulctrrs If we do not achieve any
this afternoon had two proposals mad to favorable re ult at all In the v. ~· of
the Senate, each hopefully looking e1llwr bringing the world to pcarc nca!n I ho1
to the dccscalat!on or th<' ending of thl' that Pre !dent Johnson v.lll not. he hale
war in Southeast Asia
to direct Ambn actor Goldbrrg to Ins! t
The Senator from Kentucky !Mr. upon action by the United Nations so
CooPER] recommended decsealatlng the that we may know once nnd for all "ho
war without In any way abdicating any the real promoters of the wnr In the
r<'Spons!bil!ty that we mlght have In world arc.
South VIetnam .
Mr. MANSFIELD Mr. Pr !dent, I
The Senator from Montana [Mr. thank the disl!ngu! hcd Senator from
M~NSFIELol, recommended that we make
Vermont.
an effort to reach some solution through
Mr PELL. Mr. President, will he Senthe United Nations.
ator yield?
These two proposals arc not lncomMr. MANSFIELD. I yield.
pntJblc. They can both be tned out at
Mr PELL. Mr. President, I
oclatc
the same time, and I hope that they wtll myself with the view of the majority
be
leader. the di t!ngulshed Senator !rom
The original purpose of the United Na- Montana. I congratulate him on his
tions, one of the main purpo. cs of the speech.
United Nations, was to find a way in
The basic reef upon which ncgollatlons
v.:hich to settle dissention among the na- betwe-en us, the NLF and the North VJCttions without resorting to war.
namr~e founder is that our advrrar!C$ do
It has been successful in a small way, not bel!cYc that we will a.::ccpt a govPrnbut only where the two parties to the mt>nt that rcpre cnts all the various faccontroversy have both been looking for tions of that unhappy country, South
n way out.
VIetnam.
It so happens that a long time ago, well
I think If the sugge tlons made todny
over a year ago, our Ambassador to the were presenl.<'d to a United Nations or
United Nations submitted a proposal to Security Council conference-or to any
the Security Council for Intervening In other conference-within the next few
or at least taking notice of the situation weeks and we agreed to accept the Tecin South Vietnam. As yet, nothing has ommendalions coming from It, a great
been done.
deal could thus be done to clcnr the air.
I believe the United Nations Ls in a
I believe the Senator from Montana
position where 1t must--as we say ln has put his finger on the sticking point
Yankee Land-"cut bait or fish" if it Is when he said that he hoped we would
going to be an ctrective organiZation. If accept with good grace wha~ver the reit proves that. it cannot be an effective sults of the conference were.
and efficient organization, 1l can at least
We did not accept with grood graPe the
make an effort.
results of the Geneva Conference. We
The United States cannot be the pohcc- have usually been opposed to going to a
man for the whole world, and the trouble conference and agn:c!ng to accept th,.,
we arc having In one very small part of result. I think we wIll hnve to publicly
that world indicates that we could not agree to accept the result.~ bl•fore going
posstbly police the entire world even If Into a conference. I hope that we "'Ill do
"e attempted to do so.
so.
I hope that the President will Instruct
I thank the dl tlngu! hed S nato1 from
Ambassador Goldberg to lru !st. that the Montana
Security Council take some action If the
Mr. MANSF IEI.D.
r Pr !den , I
Security Councll rcruS<'s to take any ac- yield to the di n ulshcd Senator from
tion, we will then know v.ho wants war Kansas
and who does not. '\'\ant war In this v.orld
Mr. CARh<;ON Mr Pr sld nt,1t ems
of ours.
to me that Monday, May 15, may be a
If any of the the maJor nations, the mcmorabl day In our VI nam war.
five nations holding veto pov.er on the
T~~oo outstanding addr
have been
Security Councll, undertake to veto any delivere-d In the Senate, one by the diseffort at all, then U1ey must take the tinguished maJority lead!:!r, th othr.r by
rcspons!bll!ly for cont1nu1ng au
cnla- the able Senator !rom Kentucky I fr
tlon of the war In the world It is hard Coorr.R I, in regard to the concern of c!t.ito bellcvc that they v.ill do that, butlt I
7.ens about our 5lt.uatlon In VI tnam I
possible
bcheve th t t.hc cxpr
ons In the Senate
I am not. sure that any of the plans or today sp k of the unrest In th 'at!on
proposaL~ sutmltted to us today v.ill work.
H ts prevalent v ryv.h r on g
I
but we would certainly be negligent 1l we sincerely hope t.hnt t.he dmlnl trat!on
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v.rill give every consideration to the messages that have been given in the Senate
this afternoon.
I notice that several members of the
Committee on Foreign Relations are in
the Chamber. We all remember the extended and strenuous efforts on the part
of the distinguished Senator from Oregon [Mr. MoasEJ, In our executive sessions, In regard to presenting this matter
to the United Nations. I do not believe I
speak out of turn when I mention that
we have had Secretary Rusk before us on
several occasions and have Instructed
him to go to the United Nations and urge
that they take action
We have had Ambassador Goldberg
before our committee and have expressed
to him the importance of this situation
being taken over by the United Nations.
So I say today that this war will be
settled at a conference table. and I sincerely hope that it will be settled soon.
The messages delivered In the Senate
today, which speak the minds and the
feelings of Members of this great body,
should reach not only our Nation's Capital, and the President's office Itself, but
the United Nations and other countries
as well.
I sincerely hope that every consideration w!ll be given to these outstanding
and able messages by Senators who are
familiar with and have studied the International problem that has been expressed
in the Senate this afternoon.
I commend the distinguished majority
leader.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I
thank the distinguished Senator from
Kansas for his kind remarks.
I did not note that those who are on
the floor this afternoon all happen to be
members of the Committee on Foreign
Relations, in some form or other.
I yield to the Senator from Oregon.
Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, the significance of the speech just delivered by
the majority leader is very great. The
significance is so great that I believe
I violate no privilege by making the prediction that we will be coming back to
this speech In the months ahead. I believe the speech outlines one of our last
best hopes for trying to resolve the war
in Vietnam on an honorable basis. It
offers that hope to the world without
leading to a dangerous escalation that
may involve many of the countries with
whom we are now pleading for diplomatic assistance Into World War III.
The Mansfield speech really pleacls for
resolving the war through existing peace
keeping procedures of international law.
I am in the presence of the majority
leader, the chairman of the Committee
on Foreign Relations, and the Senator
from Vermont, who have been my leaders and my teachers in many aspects of
this troubled foreign policy area. I believe the Mansfield report of the fall of
1965, In which the Senator from Vermont !Mr. AIKEN] and the others of that
commission Joined, paved the way for
the discussion that we are engaged in
this afternoon.
The Senator from ArkallSM [Mr. FUI.BRIGHT) time and time again, as chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations, has pleaded with and has sought

to involve the State Department in rational discussion of the desirability of
making use of existing peacekeeping
procedures, of the United Nations
charter and of other treaties under which
we are committed.
I believe the Senator from Montana
this afternoon has well served the best
interests of our country in this particular hour, in making a plea again that
our Government should seek official resort to the terms and articles of the
United Nations. But that is not the only
recourse open to our Government.
Comments have been made concerning
my long interest in this matter. I appreciate the references which have been
made to my consistent plans for the last
3 or more years that the administration
should insist that the United Nations
should take jurisdiction over the threat
to the peace of the world which has developed in Southast Asia. The majority
leader, the chairman of the Committee
on Foreign Relations, the Senator from
Vermont, have been very kind to allude
to my record In this request and I thank
them very much. The Senator from Kansas [Mr. CARLSON] and I have had discussions about the desirability of having
the United Nations intervene in this war
by exercising its rightful jurisdiction under the charter. More than 2 years ago,
at the President's request, I prepared two
legal memoranda for him on the subject
of our dealing with the international law
aspects of this problem through the
United Nations Charter. The second
memorandum set forth a series of specific
resolutions that the President had asked
me to draft, which would conform to the
existing peacekeeping procedures of the
charter.
The majority leader knows that of recent date those memoranda again were
discussed. They became of current importance and were the subject of some
consideration in an exchange of views
with some officials within the administration.
I wish to stress that many people who
are now saying that the United Nations
cannot be of help and that the United
Nations is useless have not taken the
time to study what the obligations of the
members of the United Nations really are
under the charter.
One of the propooals I have urged, and
urge again this afternoon-the only one
I can speek about publicly, because it is
the only one that has become public from
other sources-is that some consideration
be given by the Security Council to referring the whole matter to the General
Assembly, Yes, I would add that consideration should be given by the Security
Council to even recommending and expanding of the membership of the
Geneva Conference as a suitable format
for trying to aid the combatants to reach
an honorable negotiated settlement. Such
a format would not necessarily exclude
the Security Council from a participating party to the negotiations.
One of the arguments you hear is that
China, North Vietnam, and the VIetcong
do not belong to the United Nations. 0!
course, the commitment under the United
Nations is not that peace will be enforced
only between members. The United Na-
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tions Charter places the obligation upon
the members signatory thereto to enforce
the peace, to prevent a threat to the peace
against any country in the world or any
combination of countries in the worldmembers or nonmembers-that threatens peace. That just happens to be the
international law commitment of the
signatories to the United Nations
Charter.
I believe the Senator from Vermont
was correct when, a few moments ago,
he pointed out what the primary purpose
of the charter is. The United Nations
was formed to enforce the peace, to prevent a threat to the peace, Any other
program of the United Nations that has
subsequently developed is ancillary to
that primary obligation. I! the signatories are not willing to move to enforce
the peace, then the United Nations
Charter is truly a scrap of paper. If signatories to a treaty are not willing to
carry out their obligations under the
treaty, they have turned it into a scrap of
paper.
Therefore, the possibilities of a settlemei't of this war through recourse to
these peacekeeping procedures, which
now have been given the standi,ng of International law obligations by the signatories to the charter, are manifold.
The general tendency In the Senate is
to assume that the Security Council will
have to enforce the peace and negotiate a
settlement if the Security Council decides to take jurisdiction. That does not
follow at all. The Security Council has
the jurisdiction under the charter to exercise such an authority If it should decide to so act.
However, the Security Council has wide
latitude in working out procedural solutions for the handling of the war. It may
decide to call upon the General Assembly
to cooperate with the Security Council
by making use of the procedures of the
General Assembly, as well as the Security Council. Furthermore, I would like
to suggest that the Security Council give
very careful consideration to the possibility of exPanding the membership of
the Geneva Conference. An enlarged Geneva Conference might prove to be a very
effective international instrumentality
for helping reach an honorable settlement of the war in Vietnam.
I said on the floor of the Senate the
other day that I think it Is too bad we
ever walked out on the Geneva Conference. One of the greatest mistakes ever
made in our time in American foreign
policy was our failure to sign the 1954
Geneva Treaty. If we had stayed in Geneva as a participating member, we
might have ended up using our good offices in bringing about many changes in
the treaty including the size of the International Commission. Instead of the
treaty provision calling for a Commission
composed of three members we might
have obtained agreement for five to seven
members, with the United States serving
on it. What a dltrerence It would have
made in the implementing of the Geneva Conference Treaty I! the United
States had been a participating member,
using its great influence to help direct
and pollee the adm1nlstration of the
treaty Itself. I think the war Itself might
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CO~GRE

\ ry w U hn\ been a•erted if the United
Sta
had continued t.o sene as a voting
m mber of the Geneva Conference In

l 54.

Ill not too late t.o try to re<>stablish the

C1 n vn Conference and expand Its m~:m
b I hlp. To our everlll' llnc crl:dlt, al-

though It took us a long tim to come
point, we now support n:•convcnlng the Geneva Conf<'rrnc£•. The admini tratlon n ached that point some
15 months after tt was pnmo.Erd by
th senator from Ala.ocka !Mr. GaumT G) and me. For that. propo al, then we
we1e att.nc·ked by some administration
officials, and by the press of this country
w tth the charge that we were advocatIng negotlat.lons with Communist nations Our reply wa~. "That Is 100 percent correct We better get on with negotiating v.ith the Communists. because
they are an u ly reality which cannot be
bombcd out of existence. We are going to
have to negotiate a peaceful settlement
w1th them . We must let that time of history pass until the peoples of Communist countries become more enlightened
and arc allowed to develop a better
standard of living. When this is achieved
they wlll have economic freedom. When
they enJOY. ultimately, a better standard of living and economic freedom, In
the course of history they will then develop by !>elf-determination their political freedom But that may be 50 t.o 100
years from now "
This is no overnight problem with an
~:asy solutwn that confronts us here In
the United Slates nor, for that matter,
the rest of the people of the world. What
I wish to emphasize is that we cannot
impose either our will or our economic,
political, social, cultural, or mtlltary systems on the peopl~; of Asia.
The trouble is that there arc not many
p~;r ons thinking about the world 50 to
100 years from now. Too many are
thinking about the state of the world
In the next few years. I fear what the
:;tate of the world will be if the warmaklng pol!cirs of those advocatmg cvcrlncrl!asmg escalation or the war In Southeast A~ia leads us into world war III.
Again I wish to say that the Senator
from Montana !Mr. MANSFIELD] has perfanned a great senice here today by
urging that the Security Council proceed,
formally and officially to, give consideratiOn to what It can do to try to lead
the combatants In t.hc war In Vietnam
to a J)t•acrful solution.
The S nator from Vermont L tr.
AIKt:Nl pomt d out tl.at. more than a
:. ( ar ago v. c til I'd a resolution v. ith the
ecurlty Council In connection with the
filhu: of that resolution. the \ei-y day
we filed it we proceeded to bomb North
VIetnam As a result, dtscusslon In the
cloakroom and m the corridors In the
United Nations building m New York
City w
not at all about our filing a
r olutlon sugges•mg that the SC<'urlly
ounc I consld r dl~cussinc the war ln
Sou h a A In Instead on that hat ful
dav the d\S('U "ion 111 the Unlt.('d Nations
consl ted of bitter criticism Of the United
S
for proceeding to escalate
mbng into , ·orUl VIetnam th s:~.me day
thn we pretcndrd to offer w-1 h our other
hand e.n ol \'e branch. That hurt us irU> thl
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rl!1iocably, It. 1s one of the gr t diplomatic mistakes our Go\ ntm nt made
v.it.hln the United Nat.lons
But filing a resolution doc not fulfill
our obligation a 8 signatory to the
charter
There are sorr.e spoke~mcn for the
administration who frequently say, or
have said in the pa t that we have filed
a resolution. Filing 8 resolution do not.
fulfill our commitment as a signatory to
the charter. We filed a rcsolutwn but It
was not in a form that required Sccunty
Council acWon. It was not ln a form that
required e.ny action either by way of approval or veto by the Security Council. In
effect It was an invitation an the part of
the United States to have the Southeast
Asian war dtscu ed by the Security
Council.
We should have filed n resolution callIng upon the Security Councll to take
jurisdiction over the war. Then we
should have insisted upon our right to
have the resolution considered by the
Security Council. Please note my use of
the word "right." We have a right to have
the Security Council vote for or veto
our request that the United Nations enforce a peace In VIetnam. The Security
Council can take whatever parliamentary action It wants. Some· member
could veto a resolution calling for peacekeeping action. That 1s what I want to
find out. I want to find out what member
of the Security Council or members of
the security Council would veto a proposal urged upon the Security Council by
the United States to proceed to carry out
the peacekeeping obligations of the
charter. It is an obllnation lmpo d upon
every signatory thereto
As I told the President on more than
one occasion, and In the very recent past,
''Mr. President, I want to put France
and Ru~ Ia on the spot. I want to ftnd
out If it Is true, as has been suggested a
good me.ny times by some officials tn advice to the President, that France or
Russia, or both, would veto lt." My
answer to that advice is: Let us find out.
Let us show the world, ll'S the senator
from Vermont said by clear impllcatlon
a few moments ago, what nation or nations In the security Council arc unwilling to carry out their obllgatlons under
the charter I think we would be surprised over the outcome If we insisted
upon our right to have the security
Council vote up or down, yes or no, In
respccL to its obligations under the
charter. The charter not only vcsL~ obligations In the &curity Council, but also
makes it the duty of the security CounCil to carry them out If a nation proves
that there is a threat to the peace that
calls for the lmplement.atlon of the
charter
That is the legal Issue that we have
not pressed. We have not Insisted on gct.tlnc a rcspomc on the ls.!ue from the
Secunty Council. The official dl.'bat.e tha~
would take place tn t.hc Secuntr CoW1e I would be very salutarY Oh, I know
that. we have those ln our country who
ha\c not been very cnthuslll'Stlc about.
such a debate, because some of it would
not be a pro-US debate Titer is no
daub that a debate before t.he Security
Counctl w-ou1d cause some members o!
th Secmit · Councll to discuss a bill o!

tnt narutl.h
Un1k'<i ta , t.l.me and tim
a.ln, in
re pect to our oonduct In VI tnam
But let us get I behind u W
have t.hat d b
'1 ntually In
e
form, and we shou1d lla\' It In pari amentary form But. I nw polnt out. that
it will not be only ~ ol t1 ns of lh
United States that will be d
d, because. let me say t.o U1e Soviet Union, the
Sovlc Union also hiUI be(>n \iolatlng t.h
United Nations Charter. Althou h It is
one of the cochaJ.nn1 n or the Gt·nc>a
accords, It hll'S also been violaUng the
Geneva accords. What arc w afraid of?
It would be an lnt.(>rnat.lona.l debate
about what haPI>E'ned factually ln Southeast Asia. It would dl.scu. t.hc legal CQnsequenc of tho.se happ nin s Eventually the debate v,ill come. and we shou1d
have 1t now before lncrea lng thousands
of human beings arc killed a.: the rc ult.
of a war that shou1d be stopped now by
the members of the United Nations.
I beheve that the United Nations can
stop it now. Of course, I know It can be
polnted out that the Secretary Genl'ral
made statements, recently quo!Rd ln the
press, even over the pa.<;t weekend, in
which he expre,<;sed great doubt that the
United Nations can be of gT!'at help.
However, he 1s not the United Nations.
I share great r gard for what this man
of peace ha.~ been trylng to do. However,
on this polnt, I say respcctfu1ly, I believe he would be proved wrong if the
members of the Security Council proceeded to carry out the terms of the
Charter and their obligations relative
thereto. I am also convinced that the
great Secretary General would be the
first to welcome It If the United Nations
wou1d only agree to act.
Mr. President, a debate ln the Security
Council would be most helpful to clear
the International atmosphere In regard
to the situation tn Vietnam As I hav Sllld
to my President and to others In the exf'cut!ve branch, "If our resolution is
vetoed tn the Security Council, then move
Into the G neral A: ·J·mbly " We would
be surprised, In my judgment. by what a
salutary effect It would havl' on this
troubled world to hnvr the matter thoroughly discus.~ed In the General Asstmbly. If the Srcurlty Council refuses to
act. do not forget that under the charter.
the General AS&<'mbly could take juri diction If It deemed tt necessary, In order
to stop a threat to the J)('acc of tht world
Every mr·mlx'r of the General Alii; 'mbly.
ll'S w·cll Many other country not a member of the United 'allons, ha.: now come
to have a great stake In the ending of
the war. If the war con lnu • as wa.:
pointed out by the senator lrom Kentucky [ fr. COOPER] lhis afternoon. and
olher &nat.ors who shared his vi v. polnL,
and the w-ar Is cscala d to th point that
w·e wlll be mvoh cd In a war v.1th China,
t.hl'n put tt. down on he calendar ll v. 11
only a matter of Lim before v.:e v.1ll
be Involved m a v.ar with R
That
wtll mean, or cour • th beglnnin of
w·orld v. ar III
Mr fcCARTHY ir Pr lden wtll
lh Senator from Or on leld ?
tr
ORSE I yl ld

•
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Mr. McCARTHY. I would add two
points. First, it is important that we try
the United Nations to see whether it
cannot be helpful in this case. Second,
it is just as important, I think, at this
time, that the United States should show
it has confidence and belief in the United
Nations organization.
We have been too much inclined to
treat the United Nations as though it had
no jurisdiction within the Western
Hemisphere, in the first place, and no
real jurisdiction or application if the
United States should become involved
in problems in some other part of the
world.
Thus, it would be helpful in trying to
resolve the problem of Vietnam if a deVice
for building up the United Nations as a
truly effective instrument for preserving
and achieving peace could be accomplished.
Mr. MORSE. Those are two very important points, stated so much better
than I could state them. I completely
agree with the observations of the Senator from Minnesota.
I think it is important that we follow
the framework of international law procedure which is available to us, so that
there cannot be the slightest question of
a doubt in the minds of anyone that the
United States does seek a peaceful solution to the problem under tre rules of
international law.
Is it not going to be sad in the history
of mankind if we fail to make use of the
available procedures of the United Nations, the Geneva accords, or any other
existing treaty which can be used to stop
this war? If we in ow· time fail history,
resulting in having a major holocaust
break out, ending in the loss of millions of
lives and great devastation throughout
the world, our generation will be rightly
condemned for the rest of human history.
Then what is left of civjlization will come
forward once again with a proposal to set
up an international body which will seek
to prevent another world war.
Mr. President, how many times do we
have to go through a repetition of fai!w·e
on the part of the nations of the world,
to substitute the rule of law for the jungle
law of military might going back through
the last half century? The talk about using these procedures of the rule of law
brought forth a League of Nations. We
know that the United Nations would have
been better off had the United States not
walked out on the League of Nations, as
we walked out of the Geneva conference.
We must not make that mistake again.
We are, in effect, by not pressing our
rights under the charter, walking out on
the United Nations. I care not how many
resolutions of mere form are filed; they
are only resolutions of form, unless we
press for the exercise of rights in the implementation of the resolutions which we
file.
Thus, what concerns me is what people
100 years from now will say about our
failure, if we miss this great, historic opportunity and duty which the Senator
from Montana [Mr. MANSFIELD! this
afternoon has pleaded we rise to and
fulfill.
Let us face it: We are never going to
settle this problem bilaterally. That 18

the position of the United States today.
As to all the talk about winning and
getting out: We can win a military victory, but we cannot get out. We would
have to police the country with hundreds
of thousands of American troops for
decades to come. Eventuaily, we would
be driven out.
What is the matter with us?
The American people constitute only
6 percent of the population of the world.
Does the United States think it can
maintain a permanent, dominating foothold anywhere on the land mass of Asia?
If we think that, we should have our
he-ads examined.
We should eliminate from our minds
the inexcusable, nationalistic ego that
has taken over the American people.
The trouble with us, public opinionwise,
is that we have developed an almost
psychopathic ego.
The world, however, is not going to
permit us to stay in Asia. If we were
Asians, we would not permit the United
States to stay there, either-! mean if
we were Asians who had not become puppets of the United States.
So I think our problem is that we
need to have others come in and be of
assistance in order to resolve this difficulty. That is why Senators have heard
me plead, as I have, now, for 3 years on
the floor of the Senate, for a multilateral
settlement of this dispute. We cannot
accomplish it bilaterally because, as the
Senator from Kentucky [Mr. CooPER]
stated earlier this afternoon-these are
my words, but they are consistent with
his meaning-we have not made unconditional offers of negotiation at any time
in Southeast Asia. All of our offers of
negotiation have not been unconditional
at all. They have been conditional; we
just have not expressed the conditions.
The enemy in fact would have to come
to the peace table pretty much on our
terms, recognizing and agreeing that
there shall be two Vietnams. Who
is the United States to say that there
shall be two Vietnams? Let the rest of
the world decide that question by way of
procedures that the United Nations could
develop for a peace-treaty settlement of
this dispute. I bel1eve we would have to
kill the Vietnamese and the Vietcong to
the point of there being only a few left
before they would ever agree to two
Vietnarns. Even then the resentment in
the rest of Asia would be so tremendous
that they would dig in against us for
decades to come, out of sympathy both
for the North Vietnamese and the Vietcong because of what the United States
has been doing, until we were finally
driven out.
The only hope for real peace in
Vietnam is to have other nations take
over the negotiating. The United States
would be a party to It, but would not be
in control. That is why I believe that If
we would try to have the Security Council
of the United Nations-! hope in conjunction with and expanded Geneva
Conference--take over the settlement of
the war in Vietnam, a settlement might
be reached that both sides in the war
could llve with. It might be a settlement
which would offer some hope for avoiding world war m, I do not think a bllat-
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era.! settlement by the United States
forced upon the North VIetnamese and
the Vietcong would ever produce a peace.
It would only produce a truce leading
eventually to a massive war in Asia
against the United States.
I am willing to let history read the prediction I make this afternoon: a bilateral
settlement of the war forced upon North
Vietnam and the Vietcong by the United
States will eventually be one of the major causes of world war III.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, will
the Senator yield?
Mr. MORSE. I yield.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. First, I wish to congratulate the Senator from Oregon for
the speech he has just made. He has
made a great contribution to the discussion.
He said a few minutes ago that one of
the things that worry him is that 100
years from now people may say, "You
did not take advantage of the opportunity to use the United Nations; you did
not go to the limit in asserting our right
to have the United Nations pass upon the
dispute."
I agree to that. But what worries me
even more is what is being said today,
not what may be said in the futurewhat is said about the good faith and
the validity of offers that we have said
we have made, and statements we have
made within the last few months, to reach
a settlement promptly.
The committee had before it this
morning our Ambassador to Poland, and
we discussed at great length the episode
that occurred last December. There was
little I heard in that discussion that has
not already been in the press. In fact.
one of the bases for the discussion was
an article by Mr. John Hightower In a
very well-written article describing this
matter. There was also a letter to the
editor of the New York Times. In general,
the essentials of the December episode
were confirmed by the Ambassador.
I ask the Senator if he does not believe
that today there are very few countries
who are not our clients, who are not
dependent upon us, who bel1eve that In
our efforts, going back to U Thant's effort
back in 1964, I believe. This is the Incident that was discussed by Eric
Sevareld, and involved Adlai Stevenson.
That and subsequent efforts, I ask the
Senator, have they indicated really a
w111ingness to negotiate a settlement except on the basis of North Vietnam's acceptance of our terms, which would be
equivalent to a surrender?
Mr. MORSE. I am so glad the Senator
from Arkansas has said what he has just
now stated. It is beyond dispute that the
overwhelming majority of the nations
of the world disagree with and disapprove the course of action we have been
following in Vietnam vis-a-vis our international law obligations. They are very
much concerned with the fact that we
have not lived up to those obl1gatlons.
That is why we cannot point to a single
major power in the world that has come
to our side and participated with us in
the prosecution or this war. Those countries know they could not reconcile their
participation in that war with their International law obligations. They would
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be Joining the United St.ate ln Its vlolaUon or its International law obllgatloM.
fr FULBRIGHT. In thnt connection,
Is th Senator famlltar v.lth n statement
v.hlch has been mad by l.he St.at~ Depnrt.men . and documented by a lltUe
pamphl"'t, &hov.lng that 30 nations are
behind ~.~a on Vie nam, using as ~1dence
o! Lhelr appro\ al o! our policy and their
SUJlllOrt of u , their contrlbutlons of
medicine for the rel!f'! of sick people?
fr MORSE Or an ambulance.
fr. FULBRIGHT Or an ambulance,
or aid to people who are InJured In a
flood of the l\ll(·kong River, and so on
Is the Senator familiar with that.?
Mr MORSE. Yes, I am famlllar with
lt. I have characterized It as propaganda.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. It Is misleading
Mr. MORSE. Misleading propaganda,
seeking to give the people of the world
the Impression that those count,rles support u.~.
I see the Senator from Vermont !Mr.
AIKEN) about to leave the Chamber. I
wonder If the Senator will remain for
just a moment.
Mr. AIKEN. I was about to leave.
Mr. MORSE. I wanted to ask a question on the point we have just brought
up. I hnve not had a chance to be briefed
by the chairman of the For~lgn Relations Subcommittee-who is Senator
AIKEN-with respect to the recent meetIng on United States-Canadian relations.
Therefore, I do not know what happened.
But I was told this afternoon that even
In some of the parliamentary discussions
in Ott.awa our delegation found Itself In
discussions with the Canadians concernIng the war. I was wondering if there
was anything the Senator was free to
say about the attitude of the Canadian
delegates.
Mr. AIKEN. I do not think~ I think
the Senator will find that there arc differences of opinion In different countries, and that applies to the United
States and Canada.
I think It is safe to say that most people in the world wish that the involvement In South VIetnam were not taking
place. Most of the people In this country wish It were not taking place. too.
But I do not know that I can say anythink with regard to the attitude of the
Canadian officials.
I did want to ask a question of the
majority leader with regard to what
I think has become a landmark proposal this afternoon, and that Is if he
has any idea how this propo.o;al w1JI fare
with the adminl<tratlon. Will the President be willing to t.ake this step toward
the United Nations, which could conceivably lead to the reestablishment of
world peace and put a very large roadblock In the way of a third world war?
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, if the
Senate w111 allow me, of course, I cannot
sprok for the President of the United
States, but I can state tJJ.is When I de11\·ered the Williams lecture at Jolms
Hopkins University on January 11, I received a call from the President and also
from Ambal dor Goldberg The President said he was Interested in Lhe proposals which I had stated at Johns Hop-
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ns Uni\ mty, to
.e lh mater
before the United Nations and plru:lc lt
before lhe Sl'C'Urit) CouncU, and v.ould
I get together and t.n1k v.1th Am
d r
Goldberg and S< cret.an· General U Thant
and disc
the matu-r I
d, "Y sir "
A few days lat.cr I went to lh United
Nations I did talk '1\ith Ambassad r
Goldberg and the Secretary General. At
that time Ambe.ssador Gold~rg believed
It ml ht not be advisable to present It to
the Security Council; that perhaps more
could be done on the ba.s18 of cont.act.s
which had been OJ)Cnl'd On that basis, It
was not pushed.
In December of 1966, follo\\ing that
up, the President sent a lctt,er to Ambassador Goldberg, to be dell\ errd to
Mr. U Thant. asking him to undertake
a more thorough Inquiry In the direction
of reaching the ne{!Otlatlng t.able. to the
end thnt an honorable truce could be
achieved. Nothing came of it. Various
!actors Intervened. some of which have
been mentioned this afternoon.
I think the Secretary General, Mr. U
Thant, has done all he could possibly do.
I have nothing but commendation for his
efforts. Maybe this approach wlll afford
an opportunity to place the matter be·
fore the United Nations, becatL<;e as the
Senator has pointed out, In January 1965,
the United SLates put a resolution before
the SCCurity Council-a resolution which
Is not subjrct to a veto. That resolution
is till there.
So I would assume. on the basis of
what has been done, that the President
would not be unfavorably dtsposrd or ln
opposition, but would look with favor on
this proposal.
Mr. AIKEN. I personally do not belleve the President would reject the propo.~al, which has been made m all sincerity, and which could conceivably let
dO\\"n the bars on the road to peace
Mr MANSFIELD. I would agree with
the Senator in his analysis
Mr. MORSE. The Senator from Arkansas was speaking Ju.st before the
Senator from Vermont made his statement.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. The point I was
about to make was thnt, based on what
I believe were erroneous, misleading
statements about the support of other
countries, and based on reports indicating that we have made those efforts for
negotiations. the people of this country
believe that we have made good faith
and open efforts at negotiations--by
which I think ordinary people mean
honorable, open negotiations--they belleve we have made an open offer for a
compromi~e Reltlement. as contrasted to
a dictated settlement or a su.rrender.
I mention this partly by way of propounding my ovm explanation, but
partly because this was brought out in
the hearings of last year by mrmbers of
the Committee on Foreign Relation.'!,
when we had as witnesses members of
the administration, particularly G nera.l
Taylor, and finally the Secretary of
State, to develop the point as to what
Is meant by "settlement by negotiation,"
and whether it ls equivalent to a surrender.
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It
ms t me thn Lhe cond t.lo
v.hich hnHl been
t~erall do
nt
to
urrendcr. th t l.s, a total us nslon o! any aid on the part. of Han 1
1l ouJd
, It s rik m{, lh equb"8.1t 1 f
a surrl'nder
fr fORSF. I think It ~~oould be n rurr nd r: and also a surrender of h tr
d Ire to lun·e v. orkNI out a unitlt~d VI tnam.
. fr FULBRIGHT. Yes And .,.,e ha'e
been, I think, unwlll!ng at arn time LO
ace pt even the possibility of a untned
Vietnam.
1r. ~fORSE . That I correct
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Does the
n t.or
agree?
Mr. MORSE. Ye We have
n Insisting that the
be an lndcl>('ndent
South VIetnam. which, again, In my
Judgment, we have no right to In t
upon under international Jaw.
But I close, Mr. President. by ~U~ain
expr . sing my great appreciation to the
Senator from Montana for his public
discussion of this matter. We all know.
Mr. President, that the background for
the dlscus.~ion does now show from Lhc
public remarks that the Senator ha.~
made today. This man. may I say, ha~
been at work for a long time, trying to
help bring about a peaceful solution or
this problem within the framework or
the existing peacekeeping procedures or
international Jaw.
Mr. Pre!'<!dent, I suggest the ab encc
of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER !Mr. PFLL
In the ·chair). The clerk will caiJ the
roll.
The legislative clerk proceeded to call
the roll.
Mr MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I a k
unonimous con.~cnt that the order for
the quorum caiJ be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
obJection, It Is so ordered.

